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Three and one half years removed from the events of September 11, 2001 the 
threat of terrorism to the U.S. homeland continues, as does our national preparation for 
response to terrorism incidents and other all-risk catastrophic incidents (CIs).  Much 
work has been done by Federal, State and local authorities to prepare the nation for future 
CIs.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) has been adopted, and 
implementation continues. One portion pertaining to emergency response providers is the 
requirement for a commonly used, commonly trained organizational system and structure 
called the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
 The March 1, 2004 release of the NIMS effectively mandated the use of Incident 
Management Teams (IMTs) for multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional, and/or multi-sector 
incident response.  The NIMS-designated incident management structure is Unified 
Command (UC) staffed by a local or regional IMT.  IMT is the common name of a group 
of individuals that are formed from multiple agencies having jurisdiction, and who 
provide command and control functions at emergency incidents.  These teams have 
strong potential for improving complex incident management. However, the potential for 
interagency conflict threatens effectual IMT functioning in the absence of team skills 
instruction as an integral portion of a national IMT training curriculum.   
The IMT curriculum concentrates on technical/role responsibilities under the 
Incident Command System and omits team dynamics skills.  This thesis presents the case 
that the training for IMTs needs to include more than merely technical skills (“What to 
do”), and that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should formalize a portion of the 
curriculum to include team dynamics (“How to do it”).  Further, it argues that DHS need 
not “re-invent the wheel” when looking for sources of team dynamic theory, but need 
only look to and adapt the experience of business and academia. Over the past 20-25 
years a variety of team configurations and types have been studied and field tested.  
Particularly pertinent to the IMT model are the inter-organizational networks that 
combine members into Work Teams from multiple disciplines and agencies.  This thesis 
examines studies that shed light on the problems shared in common by Work Teams and 
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I. THESIS INTRODUCTION 
Three and one half years removed from the events of September 11, 2001 the 
threat of terrorism to the U.S. homeland continues, as does our national preparation for 
response to terrorism and other all-risk catastrophic incidents (CIs).  Much work has been 
done by Federal, State and local authorities to prepare the nation for future CIs.  The 
National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) has been adopted, and implementation 
continues. One portion of the document pertaining to emergency response providers 
(ERPs) is the requirement for a commonly used, commonly trained organizational system 
and structure called the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
 The March 1, 2004 release of the NIMS effectively mandated the use of Incident 
Management Teams (IMTs)1 for multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional, and/or multi-sector 
incident response.  IMT is the common name of a group of individuals that is formed 
from multiple agencies having jurisdiction to provide command and control (C&C) 
functions at emergency incidents.  These teams have strong potential for improving 
complex incident management. However, the potential for interagency conflict threatens 
to derail effectual IMT functioning in the absence of team skills instruction as an integral 
portion of a national IMT training curriculum.   
The NIMS-designated incident management structure is Unified Command2 (UC) 
staffed by a local or regional IMT, appointed and trained to handle the special 
circumstances of a complex incident. UC, in the emergency response genre, implies an 
equal partnership among principals.  It is formally defined by NIMS as:  
An application of [the Incident Command System] used when there is 
more than one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross 
political jurisdictions.  Agencies work together through the designated 
members of the UC, often the senior person from agencies and/or 
                                                 
1 Some sources refer to “Unified Command Teams,” others to “Overhead Teams.” For purposes of this 
study, they and “Incident Management Teams” are somewhat interchangeable, the primary difference 
being that an IMT/OT is typically a subset of UCTs.  IMTs are pre-designated and trained, whereas UCT 
is a de facto designation, and may be pre-designated or simply the set of personnel that happen to be on 
duty when a major incident occurs.  
2  The term “Unified Command” applies to multiple contexts and is used by several disciplines, including 
the U.S. Military.  This thesis applies the term as it is commonly used within emergency response 
disciplines and in the context indicated by the National Incident Management System.  In this context 
there is no single designated leader, rather the team is managed by a Command Group comprised of 
equals from multiple occupational disciplines. 
2 
disciplines participating in the UC, to establish a common set of objectives 
and strategies and a single [incident action plan]. 3 
The organizational system to be used is the Incident Command System (ICS).  To 
date (March, 2005) the training curriculum for the local/regional IMTs (called the 
“Training Roadmap”4) concentrates on technical skills and role responsibilities under 
ICS, and omits skills needed for healthy team dynamics. 
A. THESIS PROBLEM AND SCOPE: CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
This thesis presents the case that the training for IMTs needs to include more than 
merely technical skills (“What to do”), and that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
should formalize a portion of the curriculum to include team dynamics (“How to do it”).  
Further, unless trained in the “soft skills” required for successful team dynamics in the 
chaotic, high-stress UC environment, sufficient cultural differences and local agency 
history exist between ERPs to jeopardize IMT effectiveness.   
DHS is responsible for developing an IMT curriculum.  The current training 
roadmap appears to be a “low-hanging fruit” approach to developing the curriculum.  
That is, after the events of September 2001, there was an urgent need to make immediate 
progress in the area of management of CIs.  The U.S. Forest Service (USFS) has, for 
many years, been the forerunner for developing a successful incident management model 
through the ICS.  DHS could score an immediate “win” and get an incident management 
system in place quickly by adopting the successful USFS model wholesale, and 
mandating it nationwide.  However, since the use of Overhead Teams trained by USFS 
were rarely interdisciplinary, “first blush” application of the IMT training that was 
initially appropriate in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 needs to be adapted to include a 
broader subject matter, including team dynamics and conflict resolution.  An appropriate 
metaphor for the current situation is “New wine in old wineskins,” where the “new wine” 
is the current UC environment and the “old wineskins” represents the IMT “Training 
Roadmap” that has not adequately adapted to the new environment.  Like the old 
wineskins, the potential for conflict that exists between agencies may cause a failure of 
the system if the training packaging is not improved and updated. 
                                                 
3  Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, March 1, 2004, pg. 138. 
4  http://www.usfa.fema.gov/about/media/2004releases/011504.shtm, U.S. Fire Administration, Incident 
Management Team Training, IMT Roadmap. Last accessed February 18, 2005. 
3 
This thesis argues that IMT training should include team dynamics.  Further, that 
DHS need not “re-invent the wheel” when looking for sources of team dynamic theory, 
but need only look to and adapt the experience of business and academia. Over the past 
25 years a variety of team configurations and types have been studied and field tested.  
Particularly pertinent to the IMT model are inter-organizational networks that combine 
members into Work Teams (WTs) from multiple disciplines and agencies.  This thesis 
examines studies that shed light on the problems shared by WTs and IMTs, with 
particular emphasis on team effectiveness and managing conflict. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis and the qualifications of this writer to develop 
an actual IMT curriculum for team dynamics.  However, based on 27 years experience in 
the fire service and 4 years in law enforcement, concurrent with more than 31 years as an 
Emergency Medical Technician and working closely with emergency medical services 
providers on both a response and administrative level, the writer proposes a model to 
serve as a beginning point from which a framework for the team dynamic portion of the 
curriculum could be drawn.  The following paragraphs will describe the logical stream 
leading to this conclusion as it is developed in the succeeding chapters. 
Chapter II of this thesis explores the under-girding role of occupational/ 
organizational (O/O) culture in potential conflict between emergency services members 
of the IMT.  By definition, an IMT should be composed of interagency players that are 
the major contributors of resources for mitigation of the CI, and/or have 
legal/jurisdictional authority and responsibility over the scene.  The Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 defines ERPs as “...Federal, State and local emergency public safety, law 
enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical (including emergency hospital 
facilities), and related personnel, agencies and authorities.”5  This thesis considers a 
narrower set of ERPs: law enforcement (LE), fire services (FS), and emergency medical 
services (EMS).   
The occupational diversity of the IMT is a primary source of its strength and one 
of its greatest challenges.  Appelbaum, et al, state: 
The paradox, however, is that the very act of bringing people from 
different backgrounds together may be the reason why they fail to achieve 
their objective. Conflict, inherent in the nature of teams...is a factor that 
                                                 
5  6 U.S.C. 101(6), Homeland Security Act of 2002, Section 2(6). 
4 
can determine their success...[H]ow conflict is managed within the group 
can bring out the best or the worst of team-oriented organizations. 6 
Incorporating multiple players into the command structure complicates the team 
dynamic.  Other potential complicating factors faced by IMTs are: 1) the situational 
urgency and complexity, 2) cultural clashes between agencies, 3) unclear domain/role 
activities, 4) lack of clear communication agreement, 5) lack of team “esprit de corps,” 6) 
crippling stress levels, and, 7) historical issues between responder agencies.  Local ERPs 
typically have considerable history between agencies that potentially affects command 
post (CP) interactions.  All of the foregoing factors contribute to a turbulent management 
environment requiring special strategy consideration with and IMT preparation.  
“Conflict refers to a process of social interaction involving a struggle over claims 
to resources, power and status, beliefs, and other preferences and desires.”7  Chapter II 
lays a behavioral foundation for understanding the potential sources of conflict between 
local emergency response providers.  These causes may lie dormant beneath the surface 
until unearthed by the extreme and complex circumstances and environment of a 
catastrophic incident.  It is important to explore causal cultural issues between ERPs and 
talk about them openly before an incident occurs so that the team members can 
understand the views of others with whom they may later share joint command. 
Chapter II begins with a literature review about the intra- and inter-organizational 
role of O/O culture. The chapter also examines the mythology that often develops 
between agencies that is passed inter-generationally between members and accepted as 
truth about other groups. Schemas are discussed as patterns of thought that shape ERP’s 
view of the others with whom they share mitigation responsibility. The chapter discusses 
the applicability of the metaphor of sibling rivalry to the relationship of the three 
disciplines within the ERP occupational family.   
Finally, cultural issues for each occupation are discussed, as well as cultural 
issues common to all ERPs. An interdisciplinary command structure necessarily indicates 
a divergence of cultural world view.  This study examines and applies the literature 
pertaining to occupational culture and mythology, and answers such questions as: 
                                                 
6  Appelbaum, Steven H., Abdallah, Chahrazad and Shapiro, Barbara T., The Self-Directed Team: A 
Conflict Resolution Analysis, Team Performance Management, MCB University Press, Vol. 5, 
Number 2, (1999) 60-77 (60). 
7  Ibid, pg. 63. 
5 
 What qualities of LE, FS and EMS personnel affect their participation 
in an IMT positively or negatively? 
 What qualities or traits are common to all ESPs that can contribute to 
CP conflict at a critical incident? 
The purpose of Chapter II is to explore the potential of CP conflict as a function 
of the O/O cultural factors of ERPs, and how those factors may be mitigated through 
information exchange between IMT members in the training process (“cultural 
intelligence”).  These conditions, if left unmitigated by “soft skills” training for 
commanders, can lead to conflict, confusion, and collapse of the C&C structure.  By 
focusing on the potential cultural causes of conflict and understanding its sources, efforts 
can be concentrated on a training curriculum aimed at improving group effectiveness 
through conflict prevention. 
Chapter III defines a CI and cites its uniqueness as a motivation for collective 
preparation and response by ERPs.  It advances the argument for expanding the current 
IMT curriculum by addressing the theoretical base to support later application of Work 
Team theory to IMTs (Chapter IV).  ERPs routinely respond to and mitigate emergency 
incidents on a daily basis, and typically operate with an implied understanding of each 
other’s role. This mode of relatively independent operation is possible—even effective—
because the demands of routine responses do not typically cross the boundaries of 
occupational domain and agency authority.  
While ad hoc teams have had success, the preferred method of preparation for a 
CI is through pre-incident team formation, functional specialty training and routine 
emergency exercising. A CI is very different in scope and involvement by ERPs, and 
often multiple sectors of government.  Its response requirements are an interdisciplinary, 
highly coordinated force. Also, In light of the level of media and investigation scrutiny 
during and after the event, ERPs are sensitized to the demands of being in the national 
spotlight.  A catastrophic incident is defined by the recently-released National Response 
Plan (NRP) as: 
Any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, which results in 
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely 
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national 
morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in 
6 
sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost 
immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, 
and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly 
interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an 
extent that national security could be threatened. All CIs are incidents of 
national significance.8   
A CI is an emergency event that has at least five distinguishing features:  
 The incident meets the NRP definition of a CI; 
 It presents a hazard to life safety, the environment, or to property;  
 It requires the intervention/mitigation skills of multiple emergency 
services disciplines and/or jurisdictions to deal with a previous or on-
going event, or series of events;  
 It is resource intensive; and,  
 It typically involves multiple operational periods, and a duration 
exceeding 24-hours. 
Additionally, most CI’s are inter-disciplinary both in resource commitment and 
management approach, require the response of multiple jurisdictions and layers of 
government, and often involve public and private resources for mitigation and recovery.  
Some are designated as having “national consequences” due to their implications for 
national security (e.g., the Murrah Federal Building bombing, or the Columbia Shuttle 
Disaster).9  These features create a uniquely turbulent environment that distinguishes a CI 
from a “routine” emergency.  Chapter III discusses the significance of environmental 
turbulence (i.e., the demands of the business or operational environment) on the choice of 
management strategy.   
Chapter III cites the NSHS, and particularly the National Vision for incident 
management as the regulational backdrop against which IMTs may be viewed.   It 
explores the soundness of the federal mandate for ERPs to operate in UC as a strategy, 
given the potential problems extant.  It is a fact that the NSHS and the NIMS require ERP 
cooperation.  Chapter III presents the case from literature that the requirement is 
appropriate and potentially effective. Lessons are drawn from organizational theory 
                                                 
8  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Washington, D.C. (Nov., 2004), 
www.DHS.gov pp. 1-430 (63). Last accessed Feb. 18, 2005.  
9  FEMA, Responding to Incidents of National Consequences, FA-282-May 2004 
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa-282.pdf.  Last accessed February 18, 2005. 
7 
literature concerning employing a collective strategy—that is, the banding together of 
different interests to meet the demands of a turbulent environment.  Inter-organizational 
cooperation is discussed in the context of motivation to cooperate, its collective form, and 
its structural dynamics.  
The chapter concludes by tying theory to practice by discussing current 
contributing factors to the environmental turbulence into which IMTs have been inserted 
as a control strategy.  Not all of the turbulence factors are related to a particular 
emergency scene response, but all are integral to preparation of an all-risk IMT.  Many of 
the current turbulence factors cited apply to preparation rather than CI response.  
However, they all contribute to the need for ERPs to respond as a collective rather than 
individual preparation within each organization’s or discipline’s particular “stovepipe.” 
Chapter IV begins by further detailing the demands of the environment in addition 
to the complexity, turbulence and inter-disciplinary involvement cited in Chapter III.  It 
also introduces the concept of Work Team (WT) Theory as a vehicle for collaboration 
within inter-organizational networks.  Chapter IV also establishes the nexus between 
WTs and IMTs. The writer assumes that if substantial congruence can be demonstrated 
between WTs (for which much research material exists) and IMTs (for which little 
research material exists), then the principle of the Transitive Law of Equalities applies to 
some degree, and application can be made from WT research to IMT development. The 
purpose of making the connection is to establish the claim that WT research is applicable 
to, and appropriate for inclusion in the IMT curriculum. 
IMTs are relative newcomers in the realm of team performance studies, and tend 
to be associated with occupations (ERPs) that have a more action-oriented bent than 
academic orientation.  Therefore, the studies that have been done tend to concentrate on 
the technical and structural aspects of IMT function, and on selling the concept of UC to 
historically reluctant participants.  They ignore the “soft skills” that fall outside of the 
black-and-white world of the roles and responsibilities of the ICS structure.  Succinctly 
put, police officers, fire fighters and paramedics have been more interested in perfecting 
their incident management art in practice than studying it in the sociological laboratory.  
Where there is a wealth of WT sociological and anthropological studies, there is a dearth 
of literature applying the acquired knowledge to the IMT experience. 
8 
ERPs can benefit from the wealth of the academic research if it can be shown that 
the experience of WTs is substantially equivalent, or at least affirmatively related to, CI 
management and IMTs. Chapter IV establishes this equivalency. Although the objective 
focus and the operational environment of the two team types (WTs and IMTs) are clearly 
not identical, a comparison of the similarity of their basic function and raison d’etre 
establishes a preponderance of evidence of their congruity. 
There are a number of names of similar structures used in the literature included 
under the appellative heading of Work Teams.  These include Self-Managed Work 
Teams (SMWTs), Self-Directed Teams (SDTs), Inter-Organizational Teams (IOTs) and 
Inter-Organizational Networks (IONs).  WTs in this context refers to personnel who are 
assigned together, formed into a work unit, and given the responsibility and authority to 
make decisions regarding the work being carried out. They typically also jointly perform 
all of the management functions necessary for the unity, and often perform tasks formerly 
reserved for managers.10  These groups are cross-functional when drawn from different 
organizations, disciplines or specialties. Members are typically accountable to one 
another for their individual and team performance. Kirkman and Shapiro list the 
responsibility of SMWTs as:  
(1) they manage themselves (e.g., plan, organize, control, staff and 
monitor); (2) they assign jobs to members (decide on who works on what, 
where and when); (3) they plan and schedule work (e.g., control the 
starting and ending times, the pace of the work, and goal-setting); (4) they 
make production- or service-related decisions (e.g., they are responsible 
for inventory, quality control decisions and work stoppage); and, (5) they 
take action to remedy problems (e.g., address quality issues, customer 
service needs, and member discipline and rewards).  Reported WT 
benefits include the capacity for the team to manage and lead itself (i.e., 
less managerial overhead); the initiative, sense of responsibility, creativity, 
and problem solving that comes from within the team; and the team’s 
unique self-reliance.11 
 
                                                 
10  Thoms, Peg; Moore, Kirsten S.; Scott, Kimberly S., The Relationship Between Self-Efficacy for 
Participating in Self-Managed Work Groups and the Big Five Personality Dimensions, Journal of 
Organizations Behavior, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Jul., 1966) 349-362 (350). 
11  Kirkman, Bradley L.; Shapiro, Debra L.; The Impact of Cultural Values on Employee Resistance to 
Teams: Toward a Model of Globalized Self-Managing Work Team Effectiveness; The Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), 730-757 (731). 
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Chapter IV also emphasizes the topic of collaboration as an essential process/skill 
for any group where joint decision-making is important.  Included are step-by-step pre-
incident and post-occurrence processes, the essence of which are suggested for inclusion 
in the IMT formation and training in order to relieve CP stress should an incident occur.  
As stated, the training emphasis for IMTs has been technical proficiency in the task/role 
responsibilities of ICS. This thesis argues that skills and characteristics typically 
associated with WT Theory are equally essential to effective IMT functioning, and that 
by omitting such study topics, the curriculum is incomplete.  In order to present a 
complete curriculum, the IMT “Training Roadmap” currently advertised by the 
DHS/FEMA/USFA must be supplemented to include team skills.  Chapter IV makes the 
case that pre-incident and post-occurrence collaboration steps can best be accomplished 
by incorporation into IMT training rather than leaving these essential activities to chance 
with an ad hoc team. 
Chapter V applies the WT/IMT issues in terms of group effectiveness.  This thesis 
assumes that IMT effectiveness is highly desirable given that emergency responders’ and 
the collective safety of victims and bystanders are often affected by the decisions made 
by the command team. Chapter V discusses one published model’s criteria for effective 
group functioning (Hackman’s Model for Work Group Effectiveness), several criterion of 
which depend on the relational dynamics of the group.   
One method for determining which team dynamic skill areas the training 
curriculum for IMTs should include is to deconstruct the problem of the potential conflict 
established in Chapter II.  This is done in Chapter V as a Fault Tree Diagram to break the 
problem into contributing factors as Organizational, Individual and Situational Elements.  
These are further subdivided into more specific categories until an actionable level is 
reached.  The exercise significance is to identify what conflict elements can be prevented 
through team “soft skills” training, which can be prevented through personnel screening, 
and over which situational elements the IMT can exercise little control except to 
understand the difficulties and practice/exercise under realistic conditions. 
In this context, the term “soft skills” includes certain organizational and 
individual elements that contribute to team dynamics, as opposed to the “hard skills” 
associated with the pure technical duties of an ICS role.  Some examples include 
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collaboration, consensus decision making, power sharing, social capital, trust, locus of 
control, and information sharing style. This thesis asserts that negative technical and 
individual factors can be overcome by a complete IMT training curriculum that includes 
training in topics revealed by the business literature to be essential for mitigating inter-
organizational conflict. 
After a brief initial summary, Chapter VI reviews major themes of the thesis by 
answering three questions that constitute threads that run throughout the work.  These 
questions are: 
1) What is the impact of the occupational and cultural differences among 
first responders? 
2) Are WTs and IMTs comparable? 
3) To what extent is the body of knowledge pertaining to WTs applicable 
to the function of IMTs during a CI? 
 
From the answer to these questions, ten recommendations concerning the formation, 
training and use of IMTs are made, as well as recommendations for further research. 
B. A SHORT INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM PRIMER 
Intended to cause widespread chaos and life-loss, terrorism (and other CIs) must 
be approached with a common planning template in order to limit the effects of the attack 
and regain scene control as quickly as practical.  The FS developed a large-scale incident 
management system in response to wildland fire incidents in the early 1970’s.  The 
system is widely recognized nationally as a viable system for developing a command 
organization, organizing resources, and providing a skeletal framework for strategy 
development.  Since very early in the life of ICS the U.S. Forest Service has been 
working to perfect the system in a wildland (and more recently, an all-risk) setting.  They 
have become—by design and by experience—the recognized experts of the system.   
Other branches of the U.S. fire service followed closely behind wildland and 
became early adopters.  The experience has worked expertise in routine operation of the 
fire service, and has lead to its inordinate influence in the incident management realm.  
This influence causes discomfort for some in other ERP disciplines, who value C&C as a 
system, but are dubious of a universal management system application whose roots are so 
completely within the purview of the FS. ICS was adopted by most FS agencies, and by 
extension, EMS agencies (because many EMS providers are part of the local fire 
11 
department).  However, LE generally resisted ICS, either actively by refusing to 
participate or passively by not taking action. Since 9/11, the majority of police agencies 
can be charitably characterized as “late adopters,” likely because of occupational culture 
differences between LE and other ERPs that made responding within a multi-disciplinary 
structure unpalatable to them (greater detail provided in Chapter II).   
Pockets of resistance from LE agencies with respect to current Federal NIMS/ICS 
mandates still exist, even in the context of clear legal authority and the presidential 
mandate directing the DHS to act. It is logical to extrapolate that where resistance to ICS 
still exists, it would transfer to resistance to ad hoc UC on the incident scene. This thesis 
argues that resistance may be overcome by participation in a regional IMT in the 
presence of teambuilding activities. 
ICS was developed over a period of years based on the merger of fire service 
wildland fire campaign experience and military theory application.  FS managers, having 
experienced the chaos of large emergency incidents, concluded that the most applicable 
model from which theory could be adapted was that of waging war; coordination of 
personnel and resources on such a scale was most analogous to battle management.   
ICS developers identified five primary areas of concern as those consistently 
faced by ranking officers at the incident scene: 1) Command, 2) Operations, 3) Planning, 
4) Logistics, and, 5) Finance.  Command priorities were further identified and subdivided 
to include liaison activities, public information dissemination, and incident safety 
management.  These elements were organized and codified in an “org chart” format, with 
specific “area of responsibility” expectations and task descriptions. The intervening 30-
plus years of complex-incident management experience has tweaked, but largely 
validated the thought processes of the developers.  One of the more recent developments/ 
adaptations of the system was the inclusion of UC as the expected norm for complex 
incidents.  This adaptation is a primary driver of the current need for IMTs. 
UC formalizes a process by which all of the agencies and jurisdictions with “skin 
in the game” have a voice in managing the incident.  It implies an equal partnership 
among principals, and is defined by NIMS as: 
An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency 
with...jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions.  Agencies 
work together through the designated members of the UC, often the senior 
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person from agencies and/or disciplines...to establish a common set of 
objectives and strategies and a single [incident action plan].12 
An important aspect of UCT/IMT formation is that agencies frequently have legal 
or ethical mandates that they may not electively lay down.  For example, a complex 
incident (such as the crash of an airplane) may involve many and varied strategic 
priorities for which different agencies have jurisdiction—the FS owns the domains of 
hazardous materials, fire extinguishment, and rescue of trapped persons.  EMS is charged 
by law to care for the medical welfare of injured persons, while LE must document and 
investigate deaths while controlling the environment to ensure the safety of the non-
involved public.  
C. NEED FOR THIS STUDY 
On March 1, 2004 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the 
NIMS document required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5) 
issued by President Bush on February 28, 2003.  It effectively mandates13 the 
standardization of incident management in all risk applications:  
HSPD 5 requires all Federal departments and agencies to adopt the NIMS 
and to use it in their individual domestic incident management, and 
emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation 
programs and activities, as well as in support of those actions taken to 
assist State, local, and tribal officials; to the emergency response 
community; and to the private sector.14 
NIMS is designed to have a standardizing effect on incident management 
activities nationwide.  The system is best used when applied as a standardized approach 
to resource ordering, typing, deployment, and supervision:   
This system provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, 
State, and local and tribal governments and private sector and non-
governmental organizations to work together effectively to prepare for, 
prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of 
cause, size, or complexity, including acts of catastrophic terrorism.15 
                                                 
12  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, March 1, 2004, pg. 
138. 
13  Local agencies are not technically required to adopt NIMS unless they wish to receive Federal funding. 
14  Ridge, Tom, Transmittal Memorandum for Cabinet Secretaries, et al; National Incident Management 
System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, March 1, 2004. 
15  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, March 1, 2004, pg. ix. 
[emphasis added]. 
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The system is also designed to serve as a bridge between disparate agencies, 
jurisdictions, disciplines, levels of government, and sectors that could conceivably be 
involved in incident management.  Cultural differences reside innocuously embedded 
within organizations until a critical incident brings responders in close proximity under 
conditions of stress.  By emphasizing commonalities in approach and understanding, 
functional differences are minimized and blended into a concerted effort by a commonly-
understood and trained management schema.  The NIMS defines its purpose as: 
To provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, 
and local capabilities, the NIMS will include a core set of concepts, 
principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command 
system; multiagency [sic] coordination system; unified command; 
training; identification and management of resources...; qualifications and 
certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident 
information and incident resources.16 
However, functional differences are only half of the story.  Systems do not build 
bridges between agencies—relationships do. Potential IMT problems are primarily the 
result of the team nature of UC (again, made mandatory by Federal decree through the 
NIMS), particularly those concomitant with occupational cultural clashes, group 
decision-making dynamics or jurisdictional disputes between equal partners.  These 
problems may manifest as a lack of collaborative skills; and/or they may manifest as 
organizational or occupational cultural barriers between disciplines (e.g., fire service vs. 
law enforcement), between levels of government (e.g., Federal vs. local), or even 
between public and private interests (e.g., National Transportation Safety Board vs. the 
airlines industry).   
After Action Reports and anecdotal experience from past CIs indicate that there 
have been disagreements, competing strategy and goals, competing tactics, power 
struggles and other forms of conflict within the team managing the incident.17  Whatever 
“pecking order” exists day-to-day among local emergency response agencies must be set 
aside to jointly manage a CI.  But setting aside daily attitudes and thought processes—the 
schemas that form the substance of organizational culture—is not easily done under 
                                                 
16   Ibid., pp. 1-2 [emphasis added]. 
17  On the reported problems between NYPD and FDNY commanders at the World Trade Center attack 
see The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report on the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), pages 552-553, footnotes 180 and 208. 
14 
neurasthenic pressures extant at a CI.  Yet the management standard for CIs in the post-
9/11 world is to operate in UC—a multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional structure that 
includes major response agencies with legal authority and responsibility for the incident.  
Thus, the national call has been issued for regional IMTs formed at the jurisdictions’ 
relative pre-event leisure. 
The existing body of literature for WTs can be applied to training curriculum 
development to help IMT members manage conflict.  Given the difficulty of cooperation 
in a high stress, competitive environment, it is vital that a portion of IMT preparation be 
devoted to understanding one another’s occupational culture, and education and skill in 
collaborative processes.  
Although individual ERP disciplines are experienced at managing emergencies, 
the UC environment required by Federal mandate is relatively new.  The NIMS has 
formalized a structured, shared working relationship between ERPs where there has in 
the past been individual agencies/disciplines accomplishing their mission in proximity to 
others. The new arrangement has changed the relational dynamic between public safety 
partners—whereas formally they merely shared proximal space, now they must share 
C&C, and responsibility. The challenges and potential problems for the command team 
are myriad. This thesis asserts that the challenges to IMT effectiveness must be discussed 
and solved in the classroom, or they will be manifested on the incident scene.  
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II. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROVIDERS—STRANGE 
BEDFELLOWS, AND A COLLISION OF CULTURAL WORLDS 
 
This chapter examines factors of organizational and occupational culture as a 
potential cause of CP conflict affecting working relationships between ERPs. First 
responders have developed historically- and occupationally-based shared schemas for 1) 
Mentally categorizing their “real world” experience with other public safety agencies; 2) 
Filtering perceptions of jointly-experienced events; and, 3) Interpreting meaning from 
interactions.  These schemas can be grouped as cultural norms perpetuated generationally 
from seasoned officers to raw recruits, and shared by personnel of all experience levels 
throughout the departmental chain of command as the correct way to view their work 
experience and to interact with other ERPs.   
While addressing functional differences by providing structural standardization, 
NIMS does not address O/O cultural differences—nor should it.  Such a topic would be 
inappropriate for inclusion in a national standard document.  These differences reside 
innocuously—even playfully—embedded within their parent organizations until a critical 
incident brings responders into a proximal working relationship sharing C&C 
responsibility under conditions of stress.  There is, however, an appropriate forum in 
which to address occupational cultural differences—pre-incident training activities where 
“inter-cultural intelligence”18 should be a curriculum topic, and where a cultural 
knowledge base, understanding and skills for handling conflict is built into the IMT “tool 
chest.”  While actual training curriculum additions are beyond the scope of this thesis, the 
cultural differences discussed here can provide a basis for what should be included in the 
training program.  The nature, breadth and potential ramifications of the cultural clash as 
an antecedent condition affecting IMT effectiveness is the topic of this chapter.     
A. OCCUPATIONAL/ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN LITERATURE 
The study of organizational life falls mainly within the purview of Sociology.  
Ouichi and Wilkins, in a comprehensive culture literature review said: 
We offer the view that the contemporary study of organizational culture 
may best be understood as a continuation of the mainline of organizational 
sociology, which has always focused on the normative bases and the 
                                                 
18  Intelligence here is used in the sense of acuity for, or discernment of a dynamic undercurrent of human 
interaction based on shared schemas—not unlike “emotional intelligence” from management literature. 
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shared understandings that, through subtle and complex expression, 
regulate social life in organizations.19   
And,  
[T]he contemporary study of organizational culture is perhaps best 
understood as only the latest turn in the struggle between explicit and 
rational views of the organization on the one hand and implicit, non-
rational views of the organization on the other.  This tension has long been 
a central feature in the sociology of organizations...20 
The study of culture has gained an active academic and pop-management 
following since the early 1980’s.  This fascination may have its roots in the push by 
management practitioners and theorists to fix the malaise of American workers as 
compared to their Japanese counterparts during this period.  Those corporations 
experiencing the problems of falling productivity and profitability cried out to academia 
for a theoretical base from which to understand why some corporations were successful 
while others were not.  The academic microscope was trained on organizational life in an 
effort to understand how the internal environment is formed, maintained and changed:  
…[T]hese studies attempt to describe the purpose and function of patterns 
of belief, language, and symbol in organizations.  They tend to present 
these elements of organizational culture as necessary to order and stability, 
and to regard them as resistant to explicit attempts at manipulation, owing 
to their natural or evolutionary character.  Rarely, however, do they 
attempt to explain the relationship between an organizations internal 
culture and its larger cultural or socioeconomic environment.21   
 
The study of O/O culture has branched into several major themes in the past 
twenty-five years enroute to its mission to “unfreeze-change-refreeze” the culture of the 
workplace.  Ouichi and Wilkins review four variables that affect the viewpoints of those 
who seek to understand the ideology of the organization: 
The macroanalytic theories have in common an attempt to understand the 
culture of a whole group or a subgroup, or the conditions under which the 
group and its cultures or subcultures develop.  The microanalyitic theories 
present culture as something that resides within each individual, and can 
be understood through the cognitive processes of sense-making, learning, 
and causal attribution, or by probing the unconscious mind. 22 
                                                 
19  Ouichi, William G.; Wilkins, Alan L., Organizational Culture, The Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 
11 (1985), pp. 457-483 (458). 
20  Ibid, pg. 462. 
21  Ibid, pg. 472. 
22  Ibid, Pg. 471 (emphasis added). 
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And,  
...[T]hose who prefer to study organizational culture as a dependent 
variable...assert that critical features of organizational culture may be 
systematically altered by a determined management.  Those who view 
culture as an independent variable...seek to explicate the variety of forms 
through which the subtle and implicit features of organization influence 
the thoughts, feelings and behavior of individual participants. 23 
 
In this thesis I argue both the micro- and macro-analytic perspectives: that culture 
is a dependant variable (that can be changed with determined effort), and an independent 
variable that influences the thoughts and attitudes of participants—thus the need to 
address O/O culture differences in IMT training.  According to Schein, culture is shared 
on the surface, the subconscious and unconscious level within the organization, and exists 
to some degree on all of three—but in unequally weighted importance and prominence.24  
On the surface and most prominent are artifacts. These are visible, tangible, and audible 
results of activity grounded in values and assumptions.  Artifacts are the evidence that 
proves the culture.  
Underneath artifacts is the second level—values.  These are the social principles, 
philosophies, goals and standards considered to have intrinsic worth.  Values are not the 
essence of culture either, but are more closely related than artifacts.  Values operate on a 
semi-conscious level and typically by—tacit or explicit—agreement within the group or 
subgroup.  One function of values is to serve as a point of attachment or identification 
between the individual and the others in the group. 
The bedrock level of culture is a system of basic assumptions.  Assumptions 
represent the taken-for-granted (or taken-for-agreement) beliefs about reality and human 
nature.  They are the essence of culture because they are the foundation on which the 
other levels are constructed.   But even bedrock has component raw material—the raw 
material out of which assumptions are formed are the collective schemas of the 
workforce.  Merriam-Webster defines a schema as “[A] mental codification of experience 
that includes a particular organized way of perceiving cognitively and responding to a 
complex situation or set of stimuli.”25   
                                                 
23  Ibid, Pg. 478 (emphasis added). 
24  Hatch, M.J., The Dynamics of Organizational Culture, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 18, 
No. 4 (Oct., 1993), pp. 657-693 (659). 
25  http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=schema&x=17&y=14. Last accessed 
03/06/05.  
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Buried deeply within the catacombs of attitudes and self-taught truths, and 
typically operating below the radar of conscious thought and action, schemas and 
assumptions form the cultural construct on which values are built and artifacts are hung 
as decoration.  In organizational life, they are as real as the physical plant; as binding as 
the articles of incorporation; as much a determining factor of goal achievement as the 
skills and talents of the workforce; and are as inheritable as real property between 
succeeding generations of workers. 
B. THE DEFINITION AND PURPOSE OF CULTURE 
Edgar H. Schein is a leading theorist on the concept of O/O culture.  He describes 
the term as broad, referring to many aspects of organizational life and learning.  But, for 
accuracy the term should be reserved for a deep level of basic assumptions, beliefs and 
values that are shared by an organization’s members:   
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved 
its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to 
new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to 
those problems.26 
And,  
...[T]he set of shared, taken-for-granted implicit assumptions that a group 
holds and that determines how it perceives, thinks about, and reacts to its 
various environments...Norms become a fairly visible manifestation of 
these assumptions, but it is important to remember that behind the norms 
lies this deeper taken-for-granted set of assumptions that most members of 
a culture never question or examine.  The members of a culture are not 
even aware of their own culture until they encounter a different one. 27 
 
Culture serves a fundamental and essential purpose in organizational life.  It 
forms the construct by which the individual and the collective make sense out of their 
group reality. 
When a solution to a problem works repeatedly, it comes to be taken for 
granted.  What was once hypothesis...comes gradually to be taken as 
reality...Basic assumptions...have been so taken for granted that one finds 
little variation within a cultural unit...What I am calling basic assumptions 
are congruent with what Argyris has identified as “theories in use,” the 
                                                 
26  Schein, E.H., Organizational Culture and Leadership (2nd Edit.).  San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 1992, pg. 
12. 
27  Schein, E.H., Culture, the Missing Concept in Organizational Studies, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2, 40th Anniversary issue (Jun., 1996), pp. 229-240 (236). 
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implicit assumptions that actually guide behavior, that tell group members 
how to perceive, think about, and feel about things.28 
 
These implicit assumptions are composed of both individual and shared schemas, and are 
the “building blocks”—the essence—of culture. 
...[S]chema’s refer to the dynamic, cognitive knowledge structures 
regarding specific concepts, entities, and events used by individuals to 
encode and represent incoming information...Schemas are... 
conceptualized as subjective theories derived from one’s experiences 
about how the world operates.29 
 
Schemas improve efficiency by providing a template for day-to-day behavior and 
decision-making.  By establishing cultural routines, time and energy are saved for more 
challenging aspects of life: 
Schemas refer to the cognitive structure in which an individual’s 
knowledge is retained and organized. In addition to knowledge 
repositories, schemas also direct information acquisition and processing.  
They guide answering the questions central to sensemaking [sic] efforts: 
“Who or What is it?”; “What are its implications?”; “What does it mean?” 
and “How should I respond?”...The conscious and unconscious operation 
of these schemas in the actual process of making sense of operational 
stimuli is framed within a schema-directed, intra-psychic, mental dialogue 
perspective on social cognition.”30 
And,  
Taylor and Crocker have identified seven functions of schemas: 1) Provide 
a structure against which experience is mapped; 2) Direct information 
coding and retrieval from memory; 3) Affect information processing 
efficiency and speed; 4) Guide filling gaps in available information; 5) 
Provide templates for problem solving; 6) Facilitate the evaluation of 
experience; and 7) Facilitate anticipations of the future, goal setting, 
planning and goal execution.” 31 
 
Schein argues that culture is the sum of what individuals have learned of their 
organizational world, based on (a) the observed consequences of past actions, and (b) the 
success or failure of attempts to cope with needs for anxiety avoidance.32  Harris 
postulates four ways schemas impact individual perception/ interaction with culture:  
                                                 
28  Harris, S.G., Organizational Culture and Individual Sensemaking, Organization Science, Vol. 5, No. 3 
(Aug., 1994) pp. 309-321 (317). 
29   Ibid, pg. 310. 
30  Ibid, pg. 309. 
31  Ibid, pg. 310. 
32  Schein, E.H., Culture, the Missing Concept in Organizational Studies, pg. 472. 
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1)  Individual-level manifestations and experiences of organizational 
culture are revealed in the operation of a patterned system of 
organization-specific schemas held by organizational members;  
2)  Individual’s organization-specific schemas are the repository of 
cultural knowledge and meanings, and the consensual sensemaking 
[sic] characteristics of the culture;  
3) The activation and interaction of these schemas in the social context of 
the organization creates the cultural experience for the individual; and,  
4) This perspective focuses the sensemaking [sic] phenomena at the 
individual level yet connects them back into the sociocultural [sic] 
reality of the organization. 33 
 
Culture is the silent, unseen teacher continuously working, exerting influence and 
not-so-subtle pressure on the organization to conform to behavioral standards.  Without 
culture and schemas to guide behavior and decision-making, organizations would have to 
start each day fresh with a clean slate of conduct expectations, and new goals and 
understandings about their role and place in the world.  Harris tells us that 
“...[I]ndividuals’ intentions to behave are based on a reconciliation of their personal 
attitudes with the perceived normative expectations of contextually relevant others.” 34 
C. CULTURE AS A FORCE ACROSS OCCUPATIONS 
Occupational culture has the same characteristics of organizational culture but 
shared across an occupational community.  Van Maanen and Barley define an 
occupational community as:  
...[A] group of people who consider themselves to be engaged in the same 
sort of work; whose identity is drawn from the work; who share with one 
another a set of values, norms and perspectives that apply to but extend 
beyond work related matters; and whose social relationships meld work 
and leisure...Occupational communities are seen to create and sustain 
relatively unique work cultures consisting of, among other things, task 
rituals, standards for proper and improper behavior, work codes 
surrounding relatively routine practices, and, for the membership at least, 
compelling logic attesting to the logic and value of these rituals, standards 
and codes.35 
It is intuitively apparent how culture can be shared readily within a particular 
organization, but less apparent how cultural similarities develop across an entire 
                                                 
33  Harris, S.G., Organizational Culture and Individual Sensemaking, pg. 310. 
34  Ibid, pg. 316. 
35  Van Maanen, J. and Barley, S.R., Occupational Communities: Culture and Control in Organizations, 
Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 6, pp. 287-365 (287). 
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occupational construct separated by distance and locally-shared experience.  The answer 
lies at least in part in the functional commonality of members of various occupations and 
the similarity of social response by the community to each.  For example, police 
experience interactions, citizen responses, and problems in City X; police in City Y tend 
to experience the same types of interactions, responses and problems as they perform 
their duty routine. Therefore, they come to view themselves and their role similarly, even 
if they are significantly different in the minutiae.  The same principle is replicated 
naturally across the nation and among all members of emergency response agencies. 
Individuals’ schemas become similar as a result of shared experience and 
shared exposure to social cues regarding others’ construction of reality.  
Since schemas are summaries of experiential knowledge, sharing 
experiential space and time and the challenges posed by communication, 
interacting to solve common problems facilitates and encourages the 
development of similar schemas...36 
The primary role of each ERP discipline does not vary greatly with geography, even 
accounting for individual departmental features such as enhanced services, city size, 
resource levels, population demographics, community age, or climatic differences. 
Schemas describe a range of information that individuals use to make sense out of 
organizational life, but they may also form to guide interorganizational relationships.  
The above findings of Harris apply within occupations by reason of member’s frequent 
contact.  But also to the degree that the individual or groups interact in interagency 
settings, schemas across occupational boundaries may also begin to resemble one 
another, and result in a facilitated work relationship.   
Where workers have a dearth of specific experience for a new, rare and/or 
unexpected situations there may be no schema in place to guide decision making.  CIs are 
rare events—typically a “once in a career” response.  Harris cites the findings of Markus 
and Zajonc about the triggering effect of schemas. “Some schemas, particularly context-
specific schemas and event schemas are likely to be influential in cuing other schemas.”37  
Since command officers are unlikely to have specific schemas for responding to the UC 
environment, it is likely that their collaborative response will be triggered by day-to-day 
schemas, making it vital that inter-occupational relationships be positive. 
                                                 
36   Harris, S.G., Organizational Culture and Individual Sensemaking, pg. 313. 
37   Ibid, pg. 314. 
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It is important to understand that schema formation and sharing is a completely 
natural process—we do it as effortlessly as breathing—because the social order 
advantages afforded by schema operation are significant: 
How do an individual’s schemas come to resemble those of other 
organization members?  In part, the answer rests on realizing that all 
members of the community have a vested interest in the establishment of 
common meanings so that predictable social order is possible.  Individuals 
value the ability to predict and understand their circumstances that a 
shared conception of reality makes possible.38 
Harris’ point is made more efficacious considering the turbulence of a CI’s environment.  
The normal level of psychological and social comfort drawn from order and that which is 
familiar is enhanced in the chaos of the catastrophe.   
Nationwide networks for interdepartmental communication further contribute to 
shared schemas, as does the proliferation of training opportunities and the value placed 
on nationally standardized procedures.  The networking process of conferences and 
seminars constitute another way to ensure interorganizational cross-pollination of culture 
within an occupation.  Problem-solving templates are an important element of culture, 
and these mass gatherings are typically designed to propagate successful solution sets. 
D. THE INCULCATION OF CULTURE AT HIGH RANKS 
As stated previously, one function of schemas and culture is to guide successful 
achievement of shared goals. Therefore, it follows that those who are most successful at 
internalizing the culture will also be those members that are promoted to higher ranking 
positions because of their goal achievement acumen.  If true, then it also follows that the 
Police, Fire and EMS Chief Officers are the occupational representatives in whom the 
culture operates the strongest, is most entrenched, and is most relied upon for situational 
sense-making.39  These tenured officers are also the members from whom command 
leadership is expected, and in whom such authority has been vested.  The author’s career 
experience confirms the foregoing principles—command officers embody the O/O 
culture more than other members, in part because they are the ones with the most power 
to change it.  Since the systems for defining and raising up leadership themselves 
                                                 
38   Ibid, pg. 313. 
39  This is the principle demonstrated by such common phrases as “He/She is a cop’s cop” or “...a Chief’s 
Chief” when referring to the department head or his/her immediate subordinates. 
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promote internal schemas, it is readily apparent why the levels of culturally-induced 
bluster at the CP can be so high. 
In these individuals, the positive characteristic of having a highly assimilated 
level of O/O culture (which facilitates transaction of power in the administrative arena) 
can act negatively to hinder an officer’s ability to share command responsibility in the CI 
arena.  Commanders tend to be aggressive, highly skilled, highly motivated, and high 
achievers. When several high-ranking officers from different emergency services cultures 
gather in one CP with joint responsibility for managing an incident, their cultural view of 
reality tends to cause them to place different priorities on goal and task accomplishment.  
Command officers have a well-developed sense of their own culture, a variety of 
experience and considerable skills for applying its lessons within the narrower focus of 
single agency response.  But CIs, as noted earlier, are by definition multi-agency and/or 
multi-jurisdictional—the foremost characteristic of a CI is that its resource demands 
outstrip the capability of local response.  At these incidents, if command officers fail to 
make the shift effectively to a UC mindset, conflict is virtually unavoidable. 
E. HOW MYTH CONTRIBUTES TO CULTURE 
A myth is the customary vehicle—a story—by which that which is known 
individually and collectively is transferred to others.  Myth constitutes the individuals’ 
subjective reality, and the group’s collective reality—the way our environment is 
perceived and described.  Jackson and Carter tell us that myth is a mechanism for seeking 
a homeostatic equilibrium of understanding of the surrounding world, the need for which 
equilibrium is a primeval drive.  “[T]he functional role of myth in simplifying the 
environment, and furthermore, that this simplifying procedure is a prerequisite of man’s 
ability to understand given his limited capacity to process information.”40  Myths reduce 
complex concepts to a few transmutable and transmittable explanations.  
For the purposes of this paper, the role of myth is bifurcated, the first being its 
intra-occupational function of creating, transmitting and maintaining culture within the 
organization.  In this role, mythology codifies and attenuates reality by defining “bodies 
of social doctrine which validate forms of behavior and prescribed values.”41   
                                                 
40  Jackson, N.V., and Carter, P.  The Attenuating Function of Myth in Human Understanding, Human 
Relations, Vol. 37, No. 7, pg. 527. 
41  Ibid, pg. 516. 
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Myth is an esthetic device for bringing the imaginary but powerful world 
of preternatural forces into a manageable collaboration with the objective 
(i.e., experienced) facts of life in such a way as to excite a sense of reality 
amenable to both the unconscious passions and the conscious mind.42 
Jackson and Carter report the findings of Bailey that myths act within individuals 
and groups as “...cognitive maps exercising some control over what may be known and 
how what is known may be understood”; and Bruner’s complementary understanding that 
myth “serves in the place of or as a filter for experience.”43  This function gathers into one 
cultural basket who “we” are and what “we” do.  The focus is internal and serves the 
primary function of locating and delineating the individual within the masses. 
The second bifurcated role of myth in our context is to explain “our” culture 
compared and contrasted to “theirs,” especially in relation to overlapping interests and 
competition for attention and resources—our “place” in public service’s “community of 
heroes.”  ERPs as a family of occupations share a societal mythology aggregated as the 
“heroic ideal” (for example, NYPD officers have long had held the nickname “New 
York’s Finest”, and FDNY fire fighters are known as “New York’s Bravest”).  In return 
for their real or perceived sacrifices, the community idealizes ERP members.  In addition 
to community standing, the heroic ideal conveys a spectrum of real and ethereal benefits 
(besides the bi-weekly paycheck) that extends from enjoyment of the public trust to the 
occasional free cup of coffee or half-priced meal.   
With so much at stake, there exists a constant struggle among fire, police and 
EMS members to understand and enlarge their place in the Hero Story, in part by 
explaining and diminishing the role of their ERP competitors.  Leach tells us that myth is 
the vehicle by which we “...describe the beliefs of others with which we do not agree, but 
which our disagreement does not invalidate.”44  The constant competition of ERPs for 
primacy with respect to attention and resources spawn mythological explanations for 
each other’s role within the Story.  Just as siblings claw and climb over one another, and 
stand on each other’s shoulders to attract the attention of pater patriae, so do police 
officers, fire fighters and paramedics engage in verbal clawing in the form of myth-
                                                 
42  Ibid, pg. 516. 
43  Ibid, pg. 517. 
44  Ibid, pg. 518. 
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spinning.  By demeaning and degrading the other’s role in public service—even in jest—
each service attempts to establish their own schematic of superiority over the others. 
F. THE SIBLING CONNECTION 
Schemas filter and interpret reality; myths explain it; and, culture is the 
summation of perceived truth about reality.  Occupational communities share cultural 
characteristics.  Certain occupations, though distinct, share sufficient general 
characteristics to be considered in the same family of jobs (e.g., plumbers, carpenters, 
electricians and painters are within the “building trades” family; physicians, nurses, 
medical technicians, and physical therapists are members of the medical profession; the 
media family includes television, newspaper, radio and internet).  Police officers, fire 
fighters and paramedics share a relationship as siblings within the “public safety” family.  
The comparison as siblings is appropriate because of the frequency of contact that the 
three primary public service agencies have with one another, their reporting relationship 
with typically the same supervising authority, the competition between the agencies for 
scarce resources, and the constant vying for media and public attention. 
Emergency services generally have in common the protection and welfare of the 
public.  They principally differ from other organizations concerned with public welfare in 
the immediacy of the need for their intervention, the degree of danger faced in the 
performance of duty, the “24/7” nature of their work, and the interdependence and 
coordination required between them for each to reach its goals.  These factors form a 
powerful connection—bloodline, if you will—that is analogous to a familial relationship. 
Local ERPs are typically accountable to the same central authority—analogous to 
paternity.  The city seal is the family crest, and the family checking account is the city’s 
general fund.  Each sibling usually has a “paper route” (enterprise funds from fees, 
permits, fines, etc.) to supplement their unequal “allowance.” Each must pitch to the 
paternal body their own needs against the “fixed pie” city resources. Besides going head-
to-head with one another, they must compete against a litany of cousins, uncles and other 
weird relatives (e.g., libraries, parks, public works, etc.) who also want family resources. 
Birth order in the public safety family, as in regular families, is important in 
determining the power and standing of each sibling.  LE, because the departments are 
older, larger, control more resources, and because of the nature of the authority that it 
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wields takes the role of older brother.45  EMS in its present professional state is only 
about 30 years old.  Even in those cities where the emergency medical mission is not a 
separate service, but rather a division within the FS, the mission in its current 
professional form is young, relatively speaking.  Compared to the much older LE and FS, 
EMS is the “baby of the family.”   The FS is left in the unenviable position of middle 
child.  In the sibling culture it is natural for the middle and older brothers to have an 
“understanding” of each other before the youngest arrives, and for the new child to be 
viewed as intruder to the former order.  This understanding potentially makes it difficult 
for the younger to break in, or feel part of the team of brothers.   
When it is understood from where an occupation extracts its core values, the 
mechanics of relating to members of that occupation become more understandable.  LE 
and FS have long understood the quasi-military aspects of their culture, and have shared a 
common sense of responsibility for protection of the community for 150+ years.  EMS 
has difficulty because of its relatively recent birth and development (circa 1970-75 for 
most departments), and because its genesis is from a hospital-based discipline 
(emergency medicine) that was adapted for street-level application.  There are few points 
of interface between the academic world of medicine and the street-wise police officer 
and fire fighter.  It is as if the older and the middle brothers have formed a common bond 
in misunderstanding and disrespecting their mutual sibling. 
Many situations in families potentially result in repressed or active antisocial 
sentiments.  Just as self-comparisons between brothers often results in resentment, 
comparisons between departments over perceptions of treatment also cause resentment.  
Differences in pay, conditions of work, perceived preferred treatment, negotiated 
contracts, or any other situation where members perceive favoritism often results in inter-
group jealousy.  Envy and jealousy further sensitize all three to even more subtle 
inequalities, potentially resulting in a high background level of tension between 
individual members.  A self-perpetuating cycle may be initiated that can result in an 
expectation of conflict, public displays of ERP conflict, and prolonged competitive 
“wars” that are bad for citizens, and ultimately unsafe for responders. 
                                                 
45 The author grew up as the youngest among three brothers.  Nothing is implied my use of the male 
gender except that it is what I know best.  I am confident that the same analogies could be drawn 
among sisters! 
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G. MYTHS AND FOLKLORE FROM THE LOCKER ROOM 
Shared schemas among emergency response agencies about one another can be 
discerned from common descriptions heard and overheard in “locker room” talk.  One 
method of determining the true underlying schemas of an organization is to sample the 
conversations that take place in unguarded moments.  The popular myths about police 
officers and the donut shop, fire fighters hanging out playing pool (or cards, dominoes, 
etc.), and paramedics’ arrogance and failure to pay their dues (as the “new kid on the 
block”) persist, even among “brothers” that know better.  Myths passed inter-
generationally are one aspect of identification of the individual police officer with the LE 
clan, or the individual fire fighter with the FS brotherhood: 
It is possible for individuals to share a schema without being aware of that 
commonality.  However, since organizational culture is bound up in 
notions of the community, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
psychological experience of sharing is of importance in its own right.  
This is consistent with Schein’s (1985) observation that “Shared 
understanding means that members of the group recognize a particular 
feeling, experience, or activity as common.” Efforts to treat sharing as 
simply a group-level aggregation of the number of individuals holding 
particular beliefs and values neglects the fact that such an approach may 
not capture the extent to which individuals experience sharing.46 
The point at which myths and stories go beyond “poking fun” and begin doing 
actual relational damage is no clearer in inter-group relations than it is in the family.  
Myths repeated often enough become subjective reality.  Destructive interactions may be 
remembered, and retaliatory intentions may lurk under the surface—unaddressed—for 
years.  Uncooperative and antisocial feelings of one group towards another if allowed to 
fester may mutate and grow like a cancer out of proportion to the original offense.  Just as 
in a biological family, the ability to work together cooperatively as a team may not be 
apparent until external stress—such as caused by a CI—brings the poison to the surface.  
H. COMPETITION, RIVALRY, AND PUBLIC SAFETY’S HERO CULTURE 
The ultimate prize of ERPs, though remaining nebulous and undefined in the 
minds of most emergency services leaders, lies somewhere on a continuum between 
increasing the amount of resources they currently control and breaking the Federal bank. 
With the advent of terrorism, ERPs are struggling to redefine themselves in terms of this 
                                                 
46 Harris, S.G., Organizational Culture and Individual Sensemaking, pg. 318. 
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new environment, both out of the pure motivation of meeting the new challenges and the 
somewhat more egocentric motivation of improving their competitive position with 
respect to other responders.  It is apparent that no one wishes to be judged remiss in their 
duty to prepare for another terrorism tragedy. It is equally apparent that the preparation 
target is a moving one, and the “bad guys” appear as adaptive as responders. 
Unspoken-yet-true is the fact that the scores of deaths of first responders in the 
World Trade Center collapse has resulted in a real and demonstrable increase in “Public 
Safety Hero Culture Capital.”  This Capital, though intangible, has proven to be a 
profitable transaction medium that ERPs have parlayed into increased budgets, new 
positions, equipment, and an enlarged mission.  Based on some mixture of the goodwill 
of Americans, the recognition of future threat, genuine heart-felt sympathy and grief for 
the loss of first responder life, and a sense of collective guilt, the public has applauded an 
outpouring of Federal money that is unprecedented.  It is as though the Federal 
government, instead of sending flowers to the funeral home for the fallen heroes, is 
sending fire trucks and chemical detectors to every nook and cranny of the nation.  No 
duplicitous, malicious or unethical intent is implied by the foregoing. It is unmistakable, 
however, that the sacrifice of others has brought irrefutable advantages to those ERPs 
who survived them.  The ready availability of resources has resulted in an inflationary 
spiral of sorts where the list of “boy’s toys” grows ever more exotic. 
The previous information notwithstanding, on a sociological level of rivalry 
among siblings, the real prize up for grabs before and after 9/11 is preeminence in the 
Hero Story, with the accompanying accolades, admiration and tangible benefits.  The FS, 
EMS and LE cultures naturally compete anyway, and the price of poker has risen to an 
all-time high.  As the services struggle for position within the post-9/11 culture, basic 
questions concerning roles and priorities take on life-and-death proportions.   
One example of such a debate is the national priority of incident prevention vs. 
incident response.  LE naturally emphasizes prevention because of their crime prevention 
mission and intelligence component.  Lacking corresponding resources and powers, the 
FS and EMS cannot compete with LE on a prevention playing field, and are relegated to 
emphasis of post-attack response and mitigation—which they recognize as their strength 
and the circumstance in which they play the dominant role.  The ingrained cultural 
29 
response of prevention vs. response is played out daily in attitudes of command personnel 
as they jockey for position in the C&C scenario. 
I. DISCIPLINE-SPECIFIC CULTURAL ISSUES 
The following section is based upon the author’s 31-year observation and 
interaction with the culture of ERPs.  It will describe/explain specific cultural factors that 
can give rise to conflict at a CI, and should therefore be understood and discussed by 
IMT members during training. No judgment is made or implied as to whether a particular 
cultural factor is good or bad, only that it exists in some measure and constitutes a source 
of potential conflict.   
1. Law Enforcement 
a.  LE Officers View Themselves as the Ultimately Responsible 
Party (to the Exclusion of Other Emergency Services Partners) at 
Major Incidents. 
 All ERPs are used to commanding in their particular area of legal 
responsibility and authority without interference from the others.  LE, however, tends to 
view itself as the ultimate authority, presumably because of their coercive powers of 
arrest, use of force, and their mandate to preserve social order.  No savvy police 
commander would admit to feeling that his/her authority trumps that of other ERPs, or 
that he/she would under any circumstances intrude upon the purview of fire or EMS (e.g., 
take over patient care, or assume command of the structure fire).  But there are 
indications that, underlying external presentation, buried feelings occasionally give rise to 
an emotive, sub-rational response.  For example, there have been many documented 
instances where police officers have affected or threatened to arrest fire fighters or 
paramedics for failing to comply with his/her orders on an incident scene.  The specifics 
of circumstance in these cases are much less important than the cultural world view of the 
officer(s) that they possess the authority to trump that of other ERPs. 
b. LE Command Officers View Most Major Incidents Primarily as 
Crime Scenes.  
 The juxtaposition of this cultural factor with the first poses the potential of 
conflict if LE officers impose their perspective on other ERPs trying to fulfill their own 
responsibilities.  Many CIs, particularly terrorist incidents, are ultimately crime scenes, 
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but the FS and EMS have significant life safety and property conservation missions.  
These missions are of both cardinal and ordinal importance early in the incident.   
 Crime scene procedures demand tight emergency scene control, including 
limited admittance, minimal disturbance of evidence, and chain-of-custody procedures.  
These factors are important, but if LE makes the shift to crime scene procedures before 
other ERPs have completed their roles, conflict could easily be the result.  
c.    LE Officers Work Primarily/Routinely as Individuals (One Riot, 
One Ranger). 
 Police officers, particularly those outside of the incorporated city limits, 
are typically assigned one officer (or at most, two) per patrol car.  There is an economic 
logic to this modus operandi since dividing the officers allows them to cover twice as 
much area in their patrolling.  If there is a call to a particular address, the officers can 
respond to back up one another.  Even separate back up response allows officers to 
observe more and from different directions than would be possible from a single vehicle.  
Also, the nature of the vast majority of their work does not require the attention and skills 
of more than one officer, with someone as back up for safety.   
 Because the foregoing is true, LE’s response to incidents typically does 
not require much coordination between units.  The LE culture is in stark contrast to the 
FS and EMS who work routinely in teams, and teams of teams.  A typical FS response to 
a structure fire may be 5-6 fire trucks and 18-25 personnel.  This type of response 
requires a great deal of coordination and a more centralized command structure.   
d.  The LE Culture Reinforces Independent Action Primarily, and 
Coordinated Teamwork Occasionally. 
 Because LE officers work as individuals so much of the time, their actions 
on the incident scene tend to be less coordinated than either EMS or the FS.  
Accountability can be a severe problem, particularly in the instance of a developing 
emergency that presents a continuing hazard to responders.  The FS has a name for 
independent, uncoordinated action—freelancing—and the practice is strongly disparaged. 
All strategic activities should be authorized by the IMT; tactics must be coordinated by 
the Operations Section Chief according to the written Incident Action Plan.  LE officers 
engaging in freelancing activities will be roundly criticized by FS officers, and the 
actions can lead to significant conflict, as well as place personnel in significant danger. 
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e. LE Embraces and Values the Quasi-Military Culture, and Where 
Provided, Civil Service Status and Protection. 
 LE culture—including organization, rank structure, chain of command and 
promotion—has long been modeled upon the military.  Even the uniforms worn by police 
officers are designed to make their civil authority readily visible—a breast badge as the 
symbol of delegated authority to preserve order, and a cadre of weapons on the Sam 
Browne belt as an implied threat force to those who fail to comply.   The military model 
implies certain ways of doing business in LE that have been adopted as “truths” within 
the police culture—respect for rank, clear unity of command, strong command and 
control schemas, aggressive enforcement of laws, and the authority to use coercive force.   
 Civil Service Law, where it exists, is designed to protect police officers 
from political coercion to prevent the performance of their duty.   The law typically 
contains provisions relating such issues as hiring (to prevent job from becoming political 
patronage), promotion (to prevent patronage and cronyism), disciplinary action (to 
protect officers when they are required to take unpopular enforcement actions), and pay 
and benefits (to clearly delineate allowable sources of income).  Civil Service Laws offer 
both protection and restriction for peace officers, and clearly contribute to the military 
“feel” of the culture. 
2. Fire Service 
a. FS Commanders View Themselves as Expert Incident Managers 
and the Owners/Keepers of the Incident Command System. 
 The ICS was designed within the FS as a response to the need to manage 
multiple emergency unit response to wildland fires.  Since the early 1970’s, use of the 
system has developed and spread, initially as a tool for use on the fire ground, and lately 
in response to the need to coordinate multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response to 
large incidents.  Because the FS has been practicing ICS for more than 30 years, FS 
command officers view themselves as much more proficient in commanding resources, 
setting priorities, and working within the system.  As a general rule, ICS technical 
knowledge is much higher among fire fighters than among police officers or paramedics.  
 Because of the industry-wide knowledge and integration of ICS, FS 
commanders question the ability of LE and EMS officers to operate in Unified Command 
at the same level of expertise.  FS officers view themselves as incident command 
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specialists and practitioners, whereas LE and EMS are viewed as “dabblers” or 
occasional users.  This attitude can be a source of conflict if FS command officers fail to 
acknowledge the right of LE and EMS to share command responsibilities. 
b. The FS Works in Teams and Teams-of-Teams in Routine 
Response Activities. 
 This factor is directly related to the foregoing.  As noted earlier, FS 
personnel respond to “bread-and-butter” incidents (e.g., structure fires, or rescues) from 
multiple locations (typically, stations) on multiple apparatus.  Riding on, and assigned to 
each apparatus are three to six fire fighters who have trained as a team to perform specific 
duties upon arrival.  The FS uses the ICS to manage the assignment, coordination of, and 
accountability for all of this equipment and personnel.    
 Since a CI is so designated because of the seriousness of the situation, the 
scope of the incident, and/or the number of resources required, the team nature of the 
response is readily apparent.  Because the FS uses teams and the ICS to manage them on 
a daily basis, FS commanders feel uniquely qualified to act as the incident commander at 
CIs.  This attitude can lead to conflict if FS commanders fail to gracefully and 
appropriately share power, and if other responders fail to act within the team structure. 
c.   FS Commanders Stigmatize “Freelancing”—Activities not 
Coordinated Through the IMT. 
 Uncoordinated actions are anathema in the FS because of the hazard that 
they present to all first responders on the scene.  Conflicting strategy and tactics are the 
reason the ICS was developed initially.  LE and some EMS agencies are less familiar 
with ICS, and are more prone to independent actions.  The FS must understand and make 
allowances for this cultural difference, or the “freelancing” activities of agencies that are 
simply operating out of their normal culture world view will be a source of conflict. 
d. FS Commanders Resent “Special Treatment” of Police 
Regarding Salaries and Equipment. 
 The local municipal budget has long been an organizational wrestling 
match between fire, police, and (where a separate third service) EMS.  Because there is a 
limitation on the amount of resources, the competition for those resources is often fierce 
and personal.  Salaries and benefits are the primary battleground, but equipment and 
programs are also fertile areas for conflict.  Resentment is intensified by the FS 
33 
perception that LE is favored in the budget process.  This resentment can contribute to a 
history of conflict between departments that precludes cooperation at the CI scene. 
e. The FS Embraces and Values the Quasi-Military Culture, and 
where Provided, Civil Service Status and Protection. 
 Like LE, and for most of the same reasons, the FS embraces a military 
structure.  Organizational and rank structure, disciplinary procedures, and accoutrements 
of uniform convey the civil authority vested in FS personnel.  Civil Service laws serve 
also to insulate them from political winds.   Fire and police share the quasi-military 
culture, but EMS paramedics are typically closer to a medical, hospital-based culture.  
The two cultures are very different in style and values.  The differences can be a source 
of conflict and misunderstanding.   
f.  The FS is Heavily Tradition-Oriented, is Famous for Resisting 
Change, and Many Departments/Members Have a Long Memory 
for Perceived Wrongdoings. 
 FS traditions have been the major stabilizing force since its inception in 
the 1800s.  Traditions have shaped the FS culture since all volunteer fire companies 
competed with one another over neighborhood turfs and fist-fought over use of fire plugs.  
Change has been slow, and has continued to be resisted in the post-modern world.  The 
FS is adjusting to the continuing threat of terrorism—most likely because 343 members 
were victims on 9/11—and needs of CIs.  But interagency cooperation does not come 
easily or naturally to the FS. 
g.   The FS Inherited a Medical Mission Many Didn’t Want. 
 In the early 1970’s when emergency medical systems were beginning to 
be established all over the nation, the Fire Service seemed a natural place for the mission 
to reside.  Major fires were declining in number, and most fire departments already 
provided first aid and rescue capability. To fire department administrators, EMS seemed 
to be just an extension of what they were already doing, and a new market that could 
preserve the FS’s standing and improve its ability to compete with LE for resources.  
However, incorporating EMS was not exactly a natural fit, and presented line fire fighters 
with many issues—including convoluted promotional systems, mandatory ambulance 
rotations, dramatically increased call volume, and, for the first time, “burn out” began to 
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appear.  Line fire fighters felt put upon from the beginning, and the medical mission has 
caused resentment and difficulty since. 
 Even in those cities that adopted EMS and established a separate third 
service department, fire and EMS have had relational difficulties.  The FS is, and likely 
always will be the first responders for EMS because of the number and geographical 
distribution of stations allows fire fighters to arrive on the scene first and begin treatment.  
Many fire fighters—especially tenured officers—still resist a mission, because they 
“...didn’t sign on to be an ambulance jockey.” 
3. Emergency Medical Services 
a. EMS Views Their Mandate as Special Because They Deal with 
Life and Health Issues Rather Than Mere Property. 
 Personal health in our society at times seems to have been assigned the 
importance of a religion; indeed, some practice it as such.  EMS views its mission as 
more important than either the FS or LE because it deals with health and preservation on 
life.  Paramedic’s superior attitude is backed by public attitudes: health is something 
virtually everyone thinks about and considers very important, whereas a fire is something 
most people believe they will never experience personally, and LE is only a necessary 
evil.  EMS presses its advantage of providing services with which most citizens are 
concerned, and it doesn’t experience the negative citizen encounters experienced by LE.  
It is the perfect situation for the “baby of the family.” 
 All ERPs assign the preservation of life as their highest priority at every 
incident.  But EMS’s is quick to remind that it is their only mission, and believes that its 
singleness of focus sets the discipline apart from other ERPs. 
b. EMS Views Their Discipline as More Complex/Intellectual 
Versus the Simplicity of LE/FS. 
 Paramedics often view LE and FS decision making as the uncomplicated 
application of standard operating guidelines, whereas the practice of their art involves the 
more challenging decision process.  They believe that skills involved in fire fighting and 
LE tend to be more physical than cerebral, more tactile than mental.  The FS and LE are 
more closely associated with building trades and security practices than academia.  EMS 
couples itself to the mystic associated with physicians and medicine, and distances itself 
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from its blue collar brothers. This attitude leaves the impression of arrogance, and creates 
the tension between EMS and other ERPs that can result in conflict. 
c.   EMS Has a “Load and Go” Culture That Has Them On-Scene 
Performing Their Specialized Skills—Typically—for 10 to 30 
Minutes.   
 Patients ultimately must arrive at a trauma center to receive complete 
medical attention.  Paramedics perform important—often life-saving—intermediary 
attention, but the trauma “golden hour” precludes long treatment on the incident scene.  
Clinical research has shown that the longer it takes to deliver patients to a trauma center, 
the less their chance of survival. 
 Because of the need to remove patients from the incident scene quickly, 
the EMS mission on the scene of a CI is often completed in the first hour unless there has 
been a delay in transporting some of the lower priority (least injured) patients, or unless 
the resources are overwhelmed.47  After that, the chance of discovery or rescue of 
seriously injured patients diminishes rapidly.  Experience has shown that a large 
percentage of those injured who are able often self-extricate and self-transport to a 
medical facility within the first hour.   
 Following removal of the last patient, EMS’s role is typically relegated to 
a support mission for the remainder of the incident.  Yet EMS expects to be represented 
in the UCT long after most of its personnel no longer play a primary role.  EMS’s 
siblings, fire and police, are typically at the scene and involved in mitigation until the 
bitter end, busy with the investigation, debris removal and recovery of victim remains. 
d. EMS Does Not Embrace the Quasi-Military Culture, and More 
Closely Identifies with Hospital Culture. 
 EMS has more in common with the “green collar” of the hospital scrub 
than the “blue collar” of the military-patterned uniform.  The differences in cultural roots 
produce possibly the greatest opportunity for misunderstanding and conflict.  As 
previously stated, paramedics embrace their medical academic roots.  The discipline was 
originally formed out of a perceived need to move the hospital to the streets, and remove 
                                                 
47 The “Golden Hour” is a well established trauma principle and guideline.  Obviously, in a circumstance 
where there is difficulty in accessing or freeing trapped patients, EMS personnel will be required on 
the scene for longer periods.  It should be noted, however, that the “heavy rescue” skills typically 
required in these circumstances are traditionally within the FS domain. 
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the ambulance service from the funeral homes.  With EMS came greater skill applied 
earlier as intervention on behalf of the patient. 
 In the absence of an established culture and tradition, EMS made their 
own.  The culture initially formed around hospital personnel who simply applied their 
trade to the new setting, rather than the quasi-military culture already shared by FS and 
LE.  The 1970’s was a time in the country’s history when anything military was out of 
favor, and seemed to be overtly rejected rather than neglected by early EMS practitioners.  
The metaphor to illustrate the genetic differences between EMS and its ERP siblings is 
that of step-children—same mother, different fathers. 
e. EMS as a Discipline is Young and Has Not “Paid Their Dues” in 
the Eyes of the FS and LE.   
 EMS is the Rodney Dangerfield of ERPs.  Although many departments are 
retiring their first crop of 30-year paramedics, police and fire departments boast a much 
longer history, many more widows, and in some cases, trucks older than the paramedics 
that staff them.  Regardless of the experience level of individuals, a multi-generational 
experience and tradition base for the profession and individual departments does not 
exist.  This fact, coupled with the revered place that tradition holds in both the FS and 
LE, it is clear why EMS lacks respect. 
 Often EMS systems that are stand alone departments do not enjoy civil 
service status or protection, and are paid less than either of their contemporaries.  Cities 
have refused to admit EMS departments into the civil service brotherhood because to do 
so is expensive.  Paramedics resent that they often carry heavier call loads, have a heavier 
training and continuing education burden, and (as they see it) a more complex 
discipline—yet are paid substantially less. 
4. All Emergency Services 
The foregoing discussion of cultural issues has been discipline specific, but there 
are additional cultural traits that are shared between all ERPs.  The following are shared 
characteristics that can equally contribute to inter-organizational conflict, but are, on 




a. Emergency Workers Feel Responsible to Perform Well That for 
Which They Have Been Trained. 
 Whatever their quirks, all ERPs are more than ready to perform when 
called upon.  Not unlike the military, ERPs train constantly waiting for a mission.  When 
the call comes in, paramedics, fire fighters and police alike are strongly motivated to 
execute the activities they have drilled on so many times.  In the case of a CI, the self-
induced pressures to perform are even greater, partly because of the strong culture of 
performing as an integral and vital part of a team (not wanting to let the team down), and 
partially because there is a sense, like destiny, that one’s career to this point has 
culminated in this particular moment in time.  To fail to perform under such conditions 
would be tantamount to occupational failure.  
 The aggressive drive to perform presents several conflict possibilities.  
First, all three disciplines tend to narrowly exaggerate the importance of what they do, 
each considering their own piece of the puzzle most important.  Second, individual fire 
fighters, police officers and paramedics are highly motivated to take action to intervene 
on the incident scene, and, in the absence of discipline by ERPs, this trait can make it 
difficult to organize their actions to gain control over the chaos. Third, all seem to need to 
demonstrate their proclivities simultaneously upon arrival.  Fourth, devising an action 
plan can be challenging under such conditions.  Finally, each ERP commander or ranking 
officer tends to think that he/she can do the better job of organizing the response. 
b. Failure to Take Charge is Viewed as Negative by All Three 
Services. 
 The culture of all three disciplines strongly values, even insists on robust, 
visible leadership.  Each considers a failure to take or assume command to be tantamount 
to abdication of duty.  For this reason, there is a greater tendency for everyone to take 
charge than no one. 
c.  All Three Services Have A “Heroic Expectation” of Themselves, 
and Perceive the Same Expectation of Their Performance From 
the Public. 
 This cultural aspect is more esoteric than the others.  Before 9/11, but 
especially since, ERPs have been honored as folk heroes, even in the absence of heroic 
action.   Individual fire fighters, police officers and paramedics, having received a large 
amount of vicarious praise and characterization of their job as “heroic” seem to have 
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developed internal expectations that, given the opportunity, they also will perform 
heroically.  One extension of this rationale is that each expects their particular emergency 
services discipline to be the one that “rides in on the white horse to save the day.” 
d. Negative History and a Long Institutional Memory Among ERPs 
Can Color Cooperative Efforts. 
 The very public battles and ill feelings between the New York (City) 
Police Department and the Fire Department of New York (City) are legendary.  One 
needs to look no further than the bad blood and high profile feuding between these two to 
understand the sibling rivalry relationship between ERPs.  Although admittedly an 
extreme example, the NYPD and FDNY relationship is symbolic of rivalries that exist in 
cities and counties all over the nation. 
 Institutional memory tends to be long and function very well with respect 
to recording wrongdoings of fellow ERP siblings.  Hard feelings can hang on a long time, 
and be the source of failure or refusal to cooperate at an incident. 
e. Ownership Issues for Protection Districts Cause ERPs to React 
in a Territorial Manner Toward “Their” Citizens. 
 It is natural for ERPs to develop an affinity and sense of responsibility for 
their response district.  The culture of all three disciplines encourages a protective sense 
and attitude for citizens and property (sometimes referred to as “turf”).  Local ERPs show 
these tendencies more strongly than State or Federal agencies, presumably because they 
are “closer” to the people; that is, they have daily interaction with individual clients.   
 The protective, territorial instincts can be geographic or functional, and 
can have either positive or negative effects.  They are positive in the sense that the 
feelings increase a sense of investment and responsibility for the outcome of emergency 
incidents and result in Herculean output of effort.  But if held too strongly, they can have 
the negative consequence of attempts to exclude other agencies with legitimate interests.  
J. CONCLUSION:  CHANGING INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
This chapter has shown how pre-existing attitudes, perceptions and O/O cultures 
directly bear on the problem of interagency and inter-disciplinary cooperation within the 
UC context at a major, critical incident.  Many of these attitudes and cultural factors are 
not in and of themselves negative—in fact, many are the result of the very factors that 
have made command officers successful in their promotional systems, and that are 
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actively cultivated as positive traits within each department.  They only manifest in a 
negative context when it becomes necessary to apply strategically and tactically complex 
solutions in a multi-disciplinary environment to major problems under high-stress 
conditions, and in collaboration with other ERPs who share similar traits.   
Further, the interaction of many of these traits is as natural and as familiar as 
American family structure.  The sociological truth is that the macrocosm reflects the 
microcosm—that is, even a group as large as the set of all emergency services workers is 
simply a collection of individuals.  Potentially, these groups display the same struggles 
and issues as the nuclear family, and understanding the symptoms of conflict and how 
they may be dealt with, and intentional action in terms of training of IMTs will ultimately 
yield a cooperative and unified team. 
Finally, there is a need for leadership within ERPs to be more ecumenical in 
approach to CI management.  There is a tendency among the family of ERPs, with all of 
the rich traditions and entrenched sense of responsibility, to take the provincial view that 
the other siblings should gravitate toward “my” perspective and culture rather than 
negotiating new order based on common interests.  Schein writes about the biases which 
are prevalent in intra- and inter-organizational relationships and the conflicts that result (I 
have paraphrased the following to apply specifically to ERPs): 
Most of all, it will require, at the outset, the recognition that we are 
dealing with other cultures and are imposing our own cultural biases on 
them...The humanistic bias that is inherent in the field of organizational 
studies makes it hard for us to be truly sympathetic either to the [law 
enforcement emphasis of the police officer] or the [team emphasis of the 
fire fighter].  So we spend our time advocating that “they” should become 
more aware of [our culture], which is tantamount to saying give up your 
culture and become a member of ours. 48  
Harris presents evidence of a condition called “strategic myopia,” that is, the 
failure of leaders to recognize that intra-organizational schemas, while helping with 
sense-making, can also “...blind individuals to features of the world that threaten the 
validity of those schemas to operate outside their purview,”49 that is, inter-
organizationally.  
                                                 
48 Schein, E.H., Culture: The missing Concept in Organizational Studies, pg. 239. [emphasis added]. 
49 Harris, S.G., Organizational Culture and Individual Sensemaking, pg. 311. 
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The logical mandate of the foregoing discussion is that ERPs must recognize 
cultural differences and how they contribute to conflict, openly discuss the issues, and 
intentionally implement pre-response measures to increase understanding of one another.  
Further, agencies must take deliberate, positive steps to expose and heal historical issues 
that have resulted in division and disunity.  Failure of command officers to recognize 
these situations and make adjustments virtually guarantees CP conflict.  Assuming that 
command officers are highly motivated to perform well under extreme conditions, and 
that minimizing conflict and its negative affects enhance good performance, it is 
incumbent upon leaders to devise training systems, e.g., the IMT training concept, to 
counteract the effects of cultural clashes. 
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III. THE EFFICACY OF IMTS AS A CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
Chapter I referenced the changing regulatory environment faced by ERPs as they 
prepare for applying the concept of IMTs, as required by NIMS, to the problems 
presented by catastrophic incidents.  The shift in C&C procedures to Unified Command 
involving many/all of the assisting agencies providing resources for mitigation is an 
alteration of fundamental strategy for managing major incidents.  The strategic shift 
necessitated by UC is from a loose association of ERPs on-scene “doing their own thing” 
to functioning as a collective network led by a high-functioning IMT. 
This chapter focuses on IMT formation and use as an appropriate strategic tool for 
dealing with the complexity of CIs, with the overarching goal of overlaying certain 
business literature models of inter-organizational networks (IONs) and WTs in order to 
glean from them the lessons learned from previous study.  The discussion of collective 
strategy is relevant to the topic of IMTs as a base for theoretical understanding of the 
importance of joint preparation—as well as response—of the nation’s ERPs. It is 
pertinent both for understanding a successful response to a turbulent environment, and for 
the lessons the literature teaches that may be applied to an expanded IMT curriculum.  
Considerable management literature is reviewed in that details how existing studies shed 
light on the approach of IONs to meet the challenges of their own turbulent environment, 
and then the lessons are applied to IMTs as a form of ION. 
A. THE COLLECTIVE AS A STRATEGIC RESPONSE 
The events of September 11, 2001 dramatically increased the awareness of the 
nation’s ERPs about our vulnerabilities in a coordinated, dispersed and devastating 
attacks intent on causing massive damage and loss of life.  While ERPs were not 
unfamiliar with CIs previously, the events of that day demonstrated that even the largest 
and best trained agencies need assistance—and therefore a common planning template—
when simultaneous and coordinated CIs occur, as are the potential with terrorism.  A 
general consensus emerged across all response disciplines that a page in history had been 
turned in terms of the nature and scale of incidents likely to be perpetrated against the 
U.S. homeland in the future. The dispersed attacks of 9/11 represented a fundamental 
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National Vision 
“We will strive to create a fully integrated national 
emergency response system that is adaptable enough to deal 
with any terrorist attack, no matter how unlikely or 
catastrophic, as well as all manner of natural disasters. 
Under the President’s proposal, the Department of 
Homeland Security will consolidate federal response plans 
and build a national system for incident management. 
The Department would aim to ensure that leaders at all 
levels of government have complete incident awareness and 
can communicate with and command all appropriate 
response personnel. Our federal, state, and local 
governments would ensure that all response personnel and 
organizations—including the law enforcement, military, 
emergency response, health care, public works, and 
environmental communities—are properly equipped, 
trained, and exercised to respond to all terrorist threats and 
attacks in the United States.”  (National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, pg. 42.) 
shift in the strategy of our enemy, and mitigating the challenges requires a corresponding 
strategic shift by everyone involved in homeland protection.  The nation’s LE, FS, and 
EMS are widely regarded as the front-line defenders, and therefore are not exempt from 
the need for strategic adaptation. 
In a concerted effort to respond to the new threat, leadership in all three 
disciplines have called upon ERPs to embrace a collective strategy of joint planning, 
preparation, prevention efforts, and joint command and control of CIs.  Astley and 
Fombrun wrote about the importance of cooperative action in a turbulent environment: 
“The significant adjustment of a population to its environment occurs not through the 
independent action of many individuals, but through the coordination and organization of 
individual actions to form a single functional unit.” 50 
B. THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
President George W. Bush, through the DHS, issued the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security on July 16, 2002.  In the transmittal message, President Bush noted 
the previous lack of a shared vision to achieve homeland security, and stressed that the 
resultant document represents a 
“...national strategy, not a federal 
strategy.”51 It supersedes existing 
local plans or establishes such 
strategies where they do not exist.  
The document is organized to 
address six Critical Mission Areas 
(CMAs) representing the broad 
spectrum of Homeland Security.  
One of these CMAs, entitled 
“Emergency Preparedness and 
Response,”52  describes all-risk joint 
response and mitigation activities 
                                                 
50 Astley, W. Graham, Fombrun, Charles J., Collective Strategy: Social Ecology of Organizational 
Environments, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct. 1983), pp. 576-587 (579). 
51  Department of Homeland Security, Transmittal Message from President Bush dated July 16, 2002; 
National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
52  Ibid, pg. v. 
Figure 3.1. National Vision 
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by ERPs upon occurrence of a CI.  The Federal role is to “...provide funding and 
command and control support.”53 The document replaced five different Federal plans and 
consolidated them under one National Strategy (NS).   
The “Emergency Preparedness and Response” CMA details 12 major initiatives.  
The first two of these initiatives talk about incident management planning and the system 
that is designed to unite efforts of all ERPs:  
1.  Integrate separate federal response plans into a single all-
discipline incident management plan.  This initiative consolidates former 
federal plans into a single all-discipline, all-hazard plan.  It removes the 
former designation of “crisis management” and “consequence 
management” phases, and consolidates on-scene Federal authority under a 
single federal coordinator to be named for each incident. 
2.  Create a national incident management system.  The National 
Strategy “encourages” State and local ERPs to adopt an IMS by making it 
a requirement for the receipt of federal grants.  It refers to the development 
by federal officials of a NS, defines common terminology, provides a 
unified command structure, and is scalable to meet all kinds of needs.54 
The plan to which the NSHS referred was released, after extensive nationwide comment 
and several drafts, as the NIMS. 
The NSHS is an excellent point of beginning for setting strategic direction in the 
post-9/11 era.  The document is a clear statement of priorities, while leaving sufficient 
room for mission customization at the state and local level that creativity from the 
response force could be brought to bear on problems.  It artfully balanced and aligned 
internal and external components so that the clear message is that the nation’s first 
priority is prevention, but that all aspects of the problem, including response, would 
receive resources and attention. 
C. NIMS AND IMTS 
Prior to 9/11, joint planning and the sharing of a common, consistent management 
system between ERPs had been a hit-or-miss proposition, largely dependant on the level 
of local initiative.  Many jurisdictions had embraced ICS, but many had not.  A visible, 
organized, and positive C&C system at any incident is a primary requisite for success.   
The form of the C&C system in place prior to March 1, 2004 had been left to individual 
                                                 
53  Ibid, pg. 41. 
54  Ibid, pp. 41-42. 
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agencies and jurisdictions, and many mutations of ICS had evolved over its 30 year 
history.  The systems tended to be more similar than different, with most differences 
expressed as individual preferences or local practices of ERPs.  NIMS changed the extant 
capricious reality by mandating a common structure, a common system, commonly 
applied, and implemented through a common vehicle. 
As a result of the UC provisions of NIMS, there has been a strong movement 
recently in the emergency response community to encourage the creation of regional or 
local all-risk IMTs as a strategy for building competence and satisfying the requirement 
for operating in a UC environment at CIs.  For example, on January 15, 2004 the U.S. 
Fire Administration, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and the National Fire 
Protection Association, through FEMA, issued a joint press release calling for the 
creation of such teams.55  More recently, the organizational consortium issued a press 
release announcing the formation of such a team in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan 
area, and encouraging others to follow suit.   
If IMTs are to be successful as a collective strategy, inclusion of other agencies, 
disciplines and government sectors—as well as private interests—must occur.  What is 
wanted is a national collective strategy expressed as a truly interdisciplinary network of 
ERPs.  The following sections trace principles of strategic management in academic 
literature as applied to business, and makes application of these principles to the 
challenges of public organizations, generally, and IMTs specifically.  
D. STRATEGY IN ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
Venkatraman and Camillus state the definition of strategy as “...a stream of 
decisions taken to achieve the most favorable match or alignment between the external 
environment and the organization’s structure and process.”  It is an art, a balancing 
exercise that matches and aligns various components within a mix that must be crafted 
for the individual organization (but may involve multiple organizations) within the 
context of its environment.56 
According to this view, the pattern of matching the different elements—
some within the organizational boundaries (competencies and resources) 
                                                 
55 IAFC/USFA Joint Press Release, USFA Advocates Development of Incident Management Teams, 
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/about/media/2004releases/011504.shtm.  Last accessed February 19, 2005. 
56  Ventratraman, N. and Camillus, John C., Exploring the Concept of “Fit” in Strategic Management, 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July, 1984), 513-525 (513). 
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and others dealing with the environment (opportunities and threats)—is 
viewed as strategy...Recent strategy researchers also subscribe to the view 
of strategy as the process of matching environment and organization on an 
ongoing basis...Thus, strategy becomes the pattern of interactions, in 
which the focus is on...arriving at the desired configuration.57 
Strategy is not just the purview of for-profit organizations.  All organizations, 
regardless of size or sector, operate within a social environment that prescribes 
parameters.  Nutt and Backoff have modified standard business strategies (developer, 
entrepreneur, custodial and stabilizer) to fit environmental conditions pertinent to public 
sector organizations, such as ERPs.  Building on the work of Miles and Snow, Acar, et al, 
and Harmon they propose a framework for classifying generic strategies for use by public 
organizations based on the interaction of two factors—“responsiveness” and “need for 
action”—by matching them with the task environment.  
All organizations, including ERPs, must continuously monitor and adjust to their 
business environment to remain viable.  This is typically done by “...sustaining need 
recognition and responsiveness at high levels, both internally and externally”, and by 
adjusting business strategies routinely in response to the environment.  The need for 
action can have internal and/or external origins, and grows with the volume or intensity 
of calls for action.  Responsiveness occurs when leadership initiates change of the agency 
strategy (as with IMT formation) based on emergent client needs that rise to a sustained 
level of importance.58   
The responsiveness to perceived needs takes shape as the organization 
determines its prerogatives [within its recognized domain].  The type of 
action thought to be useful moves the organization from avoidance to 
compromise or collaboration, depending on how the leader responds to 
pressure for action.  The need for action that is recognized and for 
responsiveness thought to be appropriate suggests which of the strategies 
to use...[Leaders have] considerable incentive to balance needs with 
responsiveness.59 
Based on the juxtaposition of environment and the two criteria, the categories of 
generic strategy proposed by Nutt and Backoff are: 
                                                 
57  Ibid, pp. 514-15. 
58  Nutt, P.C.; Backoff, R.W., Strategy for Public and Third-Sector Organizations, Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), 189-211 (190). 
59 Ibid, pg 197. 
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• Drifters (Bureaucrats): Placid environment—low need for action, low 
responsiveness. 
• Dominators (Directors): Disturbed environment—High need for 
action, Low responsiveness. 
• Posturers (Accommodators): Clustered Placid environment—High 
responsiveness, low need for action. 
• Mutualists (Compromisers): Turbulent environment—High 
responsive-ness, high need for action.60 
 
The proposed model uses the need for action and responsiveness to categorize 
environmental and strategy types.  Applying the system to current ERP strategic 
adaptation, it is evident that the need for action in response to the potential for future CIs 
is “HIGH.”  Public sector responsiveness, of necessity has also been “HIGH.”  The 
juxtaposition of these two factors categorizes the environment as “turbulent,” and the 
appropriate strategy as “mutualist.”  It is the most proactive category in the typology.  
Collaboration is a prominent feature of this strategy, and strategic competition has little 
or no relevance in public organizations in this environment.  Organizations’ self-interest 
is subordinated to the urgency of the response need.  The turbulence of the environment 
calls for the creation of consortia among organizations that have overlapping and 
complementary mandates and missions to service client needs—which is precisely what 
an IMT is and does.   
According to the Nutt and Backoff system, IMTs appear to be an appropriate 
mutualist response to the turbulent environment in the post-9/11 era. IMTs are 
collaborative in approach and cooperative in style because of the situational complexity 
and tenebrous issues of mission and domain overlap.  All ESP members involved in 
planning understand that no one organization or discipline can be successful alone.  
Mutualist strategy seeks creative solutions to challenges, and is more open to a variety of 
participation.  Nutt and Backoff list six characteristics of organizations employing a 
mutualist strategy: 
1)  Key people set the tone by subordinating personal and 
organizational interests; 
2)  The organization develops an issue-centered focus of effort; 
3)  It establishes a consortium that draws key stakeholders into a body 
seeking to address emergent needs; 
4)  Uses the consortium to create or shape a vision to meet needs; 
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5)  Seeks “win-win” arrangements for all affected parties; 
6)  Promotes trust so that stakeholders will cooperate in meeting needs 
and shepherding the consortium toward higher levels of 
cooperation.61 
 
The Federal leadership in IMT formation is appropriate both in the scope and its 
self-defined role to this point.  The President and DHS have provided the supra-
organizational authority discussed by Schermerhorn.62  As the “ice breaker,” DHS has 
initiated and reinforced behavioral approximations to healthy relational overtures, which 
has resulted in further overtures and progress.  Employing the “carrot and stick” 
approach, DHS has encouraged cooperation through making grant funding and expert 
support available, and defined cooperation as a positive value.   
E. INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION 
IMTs as a strategy depend heavily on inter-organizational cooperation. Different 
terms in the literature are used to describe inter-organizational cooperation (e.g., inter-
organizational interdependence, component interdependence, cooperation, exchange, and 
concerted decision making).  Schermerhorn describes the lowest common denominator of 
integral relationship for organizational interdependence to be that they take each other 
into account while pursuing independent goals.63 (Of course, higher levels of 
interdependence are possible.)  Accordingly, he defines inter-organizational cooperation 
as the presence of deliberate relations between otherwise autonomous organizations for 
the joint accomplishment of individual operating goals.64 
Organizations with separate and distinct missions, even if complementary, do not 
typically cooperate without a reason.  Organizations will seek out or be receptive to 
cooperative arrangements when:  1) They are faced with situations of resource scarcity or 
performance distress; and/or, 2) “Cooperation” per se takes on a positive value; and/or, 3) 
A powerful extra-organizational force demands this activity.  Cooperation among ERPs 
exhibits a federative context, that is, a supra-organizational authority (DHS) controls and 
monitors independent activities. In the federative context organizations maintain selective 
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independence, but are influenced toward collective activity by some inducement that 
makes cooperation an attractive option (e.g., federal funding grants).   
Under those conditions where two or more organizations recognize some mutual 
need or purpose, organizational domains are not sensitive issues (domains at they relate 
to ERPs are discussed in a later section), and to the degree that prevailing norms and/or 
its external environment supports the activity, inter-organizational cooperation becomes 
more likely as an element in an organization’s behavioral repertoire.65  Thus capacity and 
need become the primary cooperative drivers:   
The challenge to be met by theory builders...is to specifically 
conceptualize inter-organizational cooperation as the outcome of a process 
in which organizational decision-makers decide on cooperation as the 
preferred action strategy, and then ultimately achieve this strategy in 
organizational behavior. 66 
The NIMS presumably includes IMTs as part of the national strategic response to 
terrorism for the same reasons that business organizations cooperate: resource scarcities, 
environmental turbulence, and overlapping interests. 
Shermerhorn further postulates that the extent to which the physical opportunity 
for inter-organizational cooperation exists (proximity) positively affects the likelihood of 
cooperative behavior on the part of related organizations.  There are a number of ways 
that physical opportunity may manifest, including in drills and exercises, as well as the 
active imagination of planners, especially when such suppositions are supported by 
external evidence of the potential of cooperative need.  If it can be further reasonably 
speculated that if an instance of failure to cooperate would be very costly to any of the 
linked agencies (as a high profile failure at a CI would be in terms of public 
scrutiny/investigation and criticism), motivation to cooperate, even in the absence of a 
specific threat, is high.  The availability of resources, either internal or externally 
conditioned upon cooperative actions and attitudes are potentially highly motivating in 
moving organizations into cooperative partnerships.67 
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F. ORGANIZATIONAL COLLECTIVITY 
Environmental turbulence caused by interdependencies often several degrees 
removed from the focal organization can constitute a threat that may go unnoticed by 
stand-alone organizations.  While individual organizations are typically focused on the 
task environment (customers, suppliers, regulatory agencies and competitors—entities 
corresponding to business-level and corporate-level strategies), turbulence in the general 
environment (domains outside the focal organization’s) can make decisions concerning 
viable courses of action difficult.  Organizations operating independently may suffer from 
the serious deficiency of being unable to conceptualize effective strategies for an inter-
organizational environment.  Collectives are particularly useful in this circumstance 
because what is obscure from one independent entity may be brought to the attention of 
the group by another member.  Collectivity, then, may be described as “…a set of 
organizations that collaborate in order to absorb the variation presented by the inter-
organizational environment…and are analogous to communal adaptations found in the 
biological world.”68 
Much has been written about IONs and their potential use of a collective strategy.  
An interesting aspect of the discussion in the literature is the seemingly opposing 
viewpoints of social ecologists and those who believe that organizations are autonomous 
in their strategic choices.  The one view emphasizes the macro effect of historical, 
sociological, economic and political factors—and their interrelationship—that control the 
response of whole populations of organizations and act as constraints to independent, 
even creative, action.  Strategic choice advocates assert that as constraining as the 
environment may be, it remains the sum of all independent actions that are within the 
control of “future-responsive, social-learning” executives.  A third, middle-ground 
position is posited by Astley and Fombrun, that organizations can overcome 
environmental constraints and the ineffectiveness of independent action through “...the 
creation of shared domains in which organizations can collectively, but not 
independently, maintain control of their own destinies,”69—again, also an accurate 
description of IMT functional purpose. 
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The social ecology view may be summarized as holding that organizations’ 
business strategies are so constrained by environmental factors that the concept of 
strategic choice is non-sequitur.  The viewpoint further asserts that these constraints 
remove meaningful direction-setting from the purview of executives, and relegate that 
role to one of largely symbolic value devoid of ramifications for survival or effectiveness.   
“In this view, all managers do is react to external constraints by accurately perceiving and 
processing information concerning environmental trends and events that originate beyond 
the organization’s domain and control.”70  Executives who suffer from myopic and 
inaccurate perception or information processing share the same natural selection 
consequences as the lame antelope on the Serengeti Plain.  Social ecology views strategic 
focus as limited to an internal matching of the organization’s resources and capabilities 
with the external demands of the environment.  External environmental forces are cited as 
another exigency responsible for the inter-organizational drift toward isomorphism. 
While the points raised by social ecologists are well taken, they underestimate the 
ability of an organizational community to engage in communal adaptation as a defense to 
an insecure, even hostile environment.  Population ecology has as its focus the 
independent effort of random organizations, and fails to account for concerted, sustained 
efforts by a collective.  Two types of communal adaptation are evident both in nature and 
in organizational life:  1) Commensalism, and, 2) Symbiosis.  As in bio-ecology, the 
appropriate level of analysis in communal adaptation is not the individual organism, but 
rather the community of which it is a part.71  Commensalism is expressed as cooperative 
and/or competitive effort between like species by which some advantage is gained (e.g., 
herding behavior of range animals); symbiosis is direct or indirect interspecies 
cooperative behavior that supplements the efforts of both (e.g., the plover and the 
crocodile).   Both of these communal adaptations have a parallel application in 
organizational interdependence within and across market niches.  Communal adaptation, 
then, through the affirmative and cooperative effort of the organizational community 
(rather than fiat of political, social, economic or historical factors) becomes the primary 
environmental constituent. 
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IONs have become a fixture/centerpiece of corporate strategy.  Increasing 
interdependence and relational intricacies characterize the many forms of networks, from 
formal/contractual to unconventional/spontaneous. IONs are a “...response to 
environmental determinism of population ecology...by recasting the concept of strategy 
in terms of collective mobilization of action and resources oriented toward achievement 
of ends shared by the members of [IONs].”72  This form of cooperation emphasizes 
collective strategy based on communal action, or “...the joint mobilization of resources 
and formulation of action within collectivities of organizations.”73 
G. TYPES OF COLLECTIVES 
The literature describes four types of collective frameworks that categorize field 
relations into types based on the cross-classification of two sets of dimensions of 
relations: direct vs. indirect contact, and communalistic vs. symbiotic relations: 
1)  Confederate Collectives—Organizations from the same “species” 
that directly interact for the purpose of concerting their actions 
toward joint ends. They are clusters of organizations that do 
compete and do interact directly; 
2)  Conjugate Collectives—Organizations from different “species” 
that jointly and tightly interact because of complementary 
functions they perform for one another. They are clusters of 
organizations that do not compete and do interact directly; 
3)  Agglomerate Collectives—Organizations that form a single 
category because of their dependence on common resources, but 
do not cohere their collective actions.  They are clusters of 
organizations that do compete and do not interact directly. 
4)  Organic Collectives—Organizations from different species that 
are interdependent due to membership in an overarching system of 
relationships.  They are clusters of organizations that do not 
compete and do not interact directly.74  
 
IMTs as a regional collective strategy will assist in the current environment by 
reducing duplication of effort and services.  They will also stretch scarce resources such 
as personnel, specialty equipment and expertise to use it, and stimulating creativity by 
more easily and quickly spreading training and ideas.  By setting the stage for further 
cooperation, a strategy of cooperation by non-competing specialization can be 
implemented.  This practice saves money by reducing the need for each community in a 
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region to have everything in terms of response capability.  For example, perhaps one 
community fire department in a region would purchase and train on hazmat equipment, 
while another specializes in heavy rescue.  Each would then respond into the other’s 
community for that type of incident. Such organizational interdependence/cooperation is 
an example of the communal adaptation type of Commensalism. 
Many such cooperative arrangements are being implemented throughout the 
nation of both symbiotic and commensalistic types.  IMTs are comprised of cross-
discipline personnel, and therefore are of a different “species”, do not compete (although 
Chapter 3 describes a type of “occupational family” competition that is non-strategic), 
and do interact.  Therefore, according to the Astley and Fombrun model, IMTs are a 
Conjugate Collective.  “Symbiotic relations [arising] from the linkage of each 
organization’s ‘primary task’ to the primary tasks of other organizations through the flow 
of work”75 is an excellent description of the dynamic between IMT members.  Other 
networks (such as the communal adaptation example citied in the last paragraph) are 
between like-species ERPs that cooperated through Commensalism, and do interact 
directly—constituting a confederate collective.  The divisions between categories of 
collectives are not often precise, and this is especially the case among ERPs.  Also, 
except those with most narrowly-honed strategic focus, most agencies in the real world 
have multiple interdependencies and network collectives.  
Borys and Jemison write about hybrid arrangements as strategic alliances.  They 
define “hybrids” as “…organizational arrangements that use resources and/or governance 
structures from more than one existing organization.”76  It is a joint effort/venture that is 
simultaneously a stand alone organization with its own character and values, and the 
product of sovereign organizations.  In a hybrid strategy, sovereign organizations with 
common interests pool resources to accomplish some mutually beneficial goal.  They are 
“...networks of power and trust through which organizations either exchange influence 
and resources, or take advantage of economic efficiencies.”77   
                                                 
75 Astley, Graham W., and Fombrun, Charles J., Collective Strategy: Social Ecology of Organizational 
Environments, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct., 1983), 576-587 (583).  
76  Borys, Bryan and Jemison, David B., Hybrid Arrangements as Strategic Alliances: Theoretical Issues 
in Organizational Combinations, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Apr., 1989), pp. 
234-249 (235). 
77  Ibid, pg. 236. 
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Though typically applied to for-profit corporations, hybrid structure and 
characteristics have features germane to IMTs.  Hybrid partners, though sharing a 
common interest that brought them together initially, often have very different goals, 
making conflict resolution an essential skill and collaboration of conflicting interests a 
routine method of operation.  
H. STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS WITHIN AND BETWEEN 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Inter-organizational relationships (IORs) occur when two or more entities transact 
resources.  Andrew van de Ven states that it is useful to look at IORs as a social action 
system because it exhibits the basic elements of such:  1) Behavior among members is 
aimed at attaining collective and self-interest goals; 2) Interdependent processes emerge 
through division of tasks and functions among members; and, 3) An IOR can act as a unit 
and has a unique identity separate from its members.78 Over time, IOR members adopt 
roles and develop expectations of one another, and by interdependence, can accomplish 
more or different goals than are possible alone.  Theorists recognize three dimensions of 
a social system: 
1)  Formalization—the degree to which rules policies and procedures 
govern interagency agreement and contracts.  An interagency 
agreement exists if any form of expression has been made between 
the parties regarding the terms of the relationship. 
2)  Centralization—refers to the locus of decision-making in a 
collectivity.  The centralization of an IOR is defined as the degree 
of inclusive or concerted decision-making by member agency 
representatives. 
3)  Structural Complexity—the number of differentiated elements 
that must be contended with and integrated in order for the IOR to 
act as a unit.  Two indicators measure the structural complexity of 
an IOR: the number of organizations involved in the IOR, and the 
number of issues or tasks on which the IOR is based.79 
 
Considering the viewpoint of a social system, the principles of formalism, 
centralization, and structural complexity can be applied to IMTs.  First, formalism refers 
to policies and procedures, standards, rules, etc., governing interactions. No credentialing 
authority for regional/local IMTs has been established at this writing except by local 
                                                 
78 Van de Ven, Andrew H., On the Nature, Formation and Maintenance of Relations Among 
Organizations, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct., 1976), 24-35 (25). 
79  Ibid, pg. 26. 
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agreement between individual ERPs.  As cited, the NSHS, the NIMS, the NRP and 
assorted other documents and laws give broad guidance.   Locally drawn and executed 
Mutual Aid and Automatic Aid contracts sometimes give detailed guidance. These 
typically only exist currently in conjugate collectives, but national and state-wide 
contracts for mutual aid are under development and should formalize a wider collectivity 
among ERPs in the next few years.  Therefore, the current relationships within an IMT 
are largely informal except by local agreement, but may have an expanded agreement 
base in the future. 
The IMT command group leads the decision-making process for incident 
management. In this sense its command authority is highly centralized.  However, the UC 
environment within the IMT qualifies the nature of their decisions as decentralized.  
Also, many tactical decisions for the incident are pushed down to lower levels of the 
command structure. 
No matter from what perspective it is viewed, the IMT must be considered 
structurally complex.  The number of facts and important pieces of information that must 
be assimilated into the decision matrix—often with life safety consequences—is 
staggering.  Typically, the numbers of organizations that interact in the formal structure 
are fewer than ten, but could be twice that in a large metropolitan area.   
There is usually a concerted effort within the IMT to equalize the contribution of 
each participating agency to the flow of resources and information.  Obviously, though, 
certain jurisdictions and disciplines, including LE, are more resource-rich than others.  
Also, with respect to information, it is the task of LE within the Incident Command 
structure to supply other members of the IMT with intelligence.  Therefore, LE tends to 
be the purveyor and controller of group information, and a resource-rich partner, making 
the discipline (in Benson’s political economy) a powerful player in the IMT mix. 
The nature of the flow of resources within the collectivity may be more important 
than the structural arrangement. In fact, resource flows are the defining criterion by 
which the growth, adaptation or dissolution of the IOR may be measured. Resource flows 
are units of value transacted between agencies, and include money, personnel, facilities 
and materials, and perhaps most importantly, information.  Resource flows are measures 
in terms of their direction, intensity and variability.  Three reasons account for the 
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importance of resource and information flows within the IOR.  First, they are the basic 
elements of activity in organized forms of behavior.  Second, task-instrumental functions 
and pattern-maintenance activities—essential for the survival of the IOR—are manifest in 
resource flows.  Third, resource flows reveal process dynamics by which power and 
strategic importance of the members may be evaluated.80 
The structure of collectivities may also be explained from the ecological 
perspective (where survival against environmental threats is primary), the social 
domination approach (where the actors or power elite manipulate systems in order to 
achieve parochial ends), or the anthropological approach (where meaning is derived 
through social construction).81 Fombrun posits that it “...may be useful to recast them as 
disaggregate facets of a more comprehensive concept of structure”: 
Thus, the structure of any social collectivity could be said to consist of 
three layers of constraint on individual organizational actions: (1) an 
infrastructure of productive activities, to which is coupled (2) a socio-
structure of exchange relationships itself overlaid by (3) a superstructure 
of shared values.  In this view, structure is understood to be a temporary 
configuration of infrastructure, socio-structure and superstructure—an 
instance in a dynamic process of structuring that embues [sic] action with 
meaning.82 
The foregoing gives rise to questions of process in the dynamic morphological 
development of otherwise unrelated organizations such as those presented by ERPs.  
Greatly simplified, there is typically an etiologic event, state or threat that serves as an 
aggregational medium for inter-organizational interest.  Individual overtures and actions 
yield coalitional activities; these aggregate to produces such outcomes as goals and 
strategies, which ultimately congeal as the infrastructure, socio-structure, and 
superstructure of the collectivity.83  Industry equilibrant forces across interdependent 
populations often result in a dynamistic movement where relational interdependencies 
that have proved mutually propitious are copied by others, and ultimately evolve into a 
best practices model.   In this context, the etiologic event for ERP collectivity was the 
attacks of 9/11; the aggregating medium has become the IMT, and the precipitate is a 
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cadre of regional interdisciplinary teams of expert incident managers that train, exercise 
and respond together.   
I. IONS AS A POLITICAL ECONOMY (PE) 
Benson argues that all interactions between networks (even service delivery 
cooperation) are ultimately resource-acquisition dependent.  “The [ION] may be 
conceived as a political economy concerned with the distribution of scarce resources, 
money and authority.”84  Money is self-evident; authority is described as “...the 
legitimating of activities, the right and responsibility to carry out programs of a certain 
kind, dealing with a broad problem area or focus...Legitimated claims of this kind are 
termed domains.  The possession of a domain permits the organization to operate in a 
certain sphere, claim support for its activities, and define proper practices within its 
realm.”85 As for the discussion on environmental factors and their role in influencing 
strategic choice, Benson addresses environmental importance from the PE perspective, 
but he claims that it is only  “...important insofar as it affects 1) the supply of two 
resources, money and authority, and 2) the distribution of power within the network.”86  
Controlling resources is one source of network power, but there are others.  The 
size and degree of mobilization of a member’s constituency, and their social status is 
another source.  More powerful members are those able to force favorable solutions in 
negotiations.  Very powerful members are able to reach across agency boundaries to 
determine policies, procedures, rules, and/or operating guidelines of weaker members.87 
Finally, Benson addresses the concept of equilibrium within the ION.  He claims 
it is “...equilibrated to the extent that participant organizations are engaged in highly 
coordinated, cooperative interactions based on normative consensus and mutual 
respect.”88   He identifies four dimensions of equilibrium: 
1)  Domain Consensus—Agreement regarding the appropriate role 
and scope of an agency. 
2)  Ideological Consensus—Agreement regarding the nature of the 
tasks confronted by organizations and appropriate approaches to 
those tasks. 
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3)  Positive Evaluation—The judgment by workers in one 
organization of the value of the work of the other organization. 
4)  Work Coordination—Patterns of collaboration and cooperation 
between organizations. Work is coordinated to the extent that 
programs and activities in two or more organizations are geared 
into each other with a maximum of effectiveness and efficiency.89 
 
J. ORGANIZATIONAL DOMAINS 
There are many taxonomic systems proposed by different researchers for various 
contingency approaches to selecting a business strategy.  It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to review all of these, but it is worth noting that a common theme in the differential 
between taxonomies is the concept of organizational/ occupational domain, its defense, 
expansion, stability, or abandonment.  Domain is vital to the discussion of IONs 
(especially those involving ERPS) in the public sphere because of its potential for 
conflict genesis.  Administrators, and to a lesser degree all members, seek to maintain an 
undisputed claim to a clear domain of high social importance.    Such a domain is 
characterized by one or more of the following; the greater the domain approximates these 
criteria, the greater the agency hold over funds and authority within that sphere: 
1)  Exclusiveness—untrammeled, unchallenged by other 
organizations; 
2)  Autonomy—a claim permitting the performance of activities 
independently, without supervision, direction, or shared authority 
by another agency;   
3)  Dominance—a claim permitting authoritative direction of other 
agencies operating in a specified sphere; and, 
4) Application and defense of the agency’s paradigm—participants 
are committed to the agency’s definitions of problems and tasks, 
and techniques for doing things.90 
 
Althaus and Yarwood explain that formal authority is an especially important 
resource, since its manipulation is a major strategy that an organization can use to 
increase its dominance in a field or reduce its dependence on other organizations.  They 
continue that conflict results when two or more types of organizations (such as make up 
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the set of ERPs) make a claim over the same population or service (or incident scene).91  
Mandated authority may be an effective bridge across disputed domain overlap areas, and 
sometimes mandates may be cited to establish priority to the interests of one agency over 
another.  Where no clear mandate exists, network members must negotiate their own 
order, recognizing their own unique interests, but also mindful of their “stake in 
maintaining a set of structures and understandings that [facilitates] policy making in the 
domain.”92  In settling domain disputes between agencies, they suggest developing a 
negotiated order between members, each understanding the agency’s stake in its 
maintenance.  They further recommend seeking clear legal mandates, where applicable, 
and recognition of the importance of boundary-spanning groups between agencies.  
Finally, they suggest a “rich mosaic of coordinating bodies and working groups which 
[tie] the domain together and afforded much predictability about likely behaviors.”93 
K. IMTS AS A COLLECTIVE STRATEGY 
Other reasons for shifting strategy (in business and public service) include the 
level of aggression by or against the organization, the availability of resources, a 
new/renewed public mandate, and/or the occurrence of a seminal event.  The seminal 
event resulting in the IMT formation push was the coordinated attacks of Sept. 11. The 
turbulence present in the environment (and likely to be present for some time to come) 
that serves as a powerful motivator for cooperation is terrorism, but other all-risk hazards 
also.  The motivation for IMT formation does not follow the industrial model of 
competition and power retention, but rather an affirmative need for joint and cooperative 
planning and activities to manage complexity in light of lessons learned from major 
terrorist attacks.  Response to CIs would be simplified if clear domain rules could be 
explicated; but their nature—particularly those arising from terrorism—defies 
categorization as purely a LE, FS, or EMS issue. 
L. ELEMENTS OF THE TURBULENT ENVIRONMENT 
The literature and this author have stressed the importance of the environment in 
which strategic decisions are made.  The natural question at this point is “What are the 
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current environmental factors that contribute to the need for IMTs?”  While not intended 
to be a complete environmental analysis, major enabling and limiting determinants for 
ERPs can be listed: 
 Federal, State and local governments are experiencing increasing service demands 
and decreasing revenues.  Unfunded mandates are common; 
 New and emboldened terrorist groups (foreign and domestic) have formed and are 
operating within the United States;  
 U.S. citizens (ERP’s “customers”) have been sensitized to terrorism as a threat, 
and hold high expectations for protection; 
 Some Federal funding has become available to pay for increases in terrorism 
security, but far less than is needed; 
 Federal funding typically does not pay for personnel, nor can it be spent for high-
cost items like training or equipment maintenance contracts; 
 There is an increase in many types of natural and man-made hazards other than 
terrorism, e.g., tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, volcano eruptions, hazardous 
materials spills, transportations accidents, etc.; 
 ERP infrastructure (apparatus, equipment, communications, facilities) are 
substandard and aging in many regions of the country; 
 Equipping and training ERPs for all-hazards response is incredibly complex, 
expensive and time consuming; 
 There exists a wide disparity between metropolitan areas and rural, sparsely-
populated areas in terms of both the level of protection and risk; 
 Existing inter-organizational relationships are few; many that do exist have, and 
continue to suffer from negative interagency history; 
 Occupational culture differences between ERPs strain relationships; 
 The enemy is adaptive, constantly probing for defense and security system 
weaknesses; 
 Change is occurring at a very rapid rate. Many sectors of government are 
currently formulating plans involving/affecting ERP agencies; 
 Technology to assist with the ERP mission is expanding rapidly; 
 Standards and guidelines are being promulgated faster than they can be 
effectively assimilated. 
While environmental factors are not all negative, there is no shortage of 
challenges.  I believe it is accurate—perhaps even an understatement—to conclude that 
the above issues faced by ERPS classify the current environment as turbulent. Business 
literature supports and clarifies the use of a collective strategy as an appropriate strategy 
for mastering the turbulence presented by catastrophic incidents. 
M. CONCLUSION 
A collective strategy for dealing with the current turbulent threat environment is 
appropriate.  Further, the literature supports the contention that implementation of IMTs 
as a form of ION to connect ERPs is equally appropriate. What is yet lacking in Federal 
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leadership is an IMT curriculum design that incorporates not only the technical 
knowledge of CI management techniques and responsibilities, but also incorporates the 
lessons learned by American business and academia about the “soft skills” of team 
cooperation and collaboration.  DHS, through FEMA, should provide team selection 
criteria, instructional materials, and a registration system and continuing education 
requirements for accreditation for team members. The concept behind IMTs is the same 
as has been referenced throughout this chapter—a designated group of experienced, 
typically senior-level managers who train together, study specialty positions within ICS, 
and function as an IMT in the instance of a CI.  The concept is sound; but as currently 
designed the training tends to focus on ICS responsibilities and ignores team skills.  It 
would not be accurate to say that “soft skills” are deprecated—in fact, there is a strong 
appreciation for them among current IMT members of the U.S. Forest Service.94  But to 
date, team-function skills have not been incorporated into a national IMT curriculum. 
One explanation for the absence of team-functioning skills training in the formal 
curriculum (but a strong appreciation of the skills within the practitioners) is that team 
members may be expected to develop the skills outside of the IMT classroom.  Another 
possible explanation is that desired team skills are expected to form naturally in the 
“shadowing” phase of training or after members are assigned to a particular team.  A 
third possibility is that those controlling entry and assignment to an IMT will test for the 
presence of such skills prior to appointment of the member. 
In the uncertain, turbulent environment that currently exists among emergency 
response providers, a collective strategy with IMTs as the central focus offers the greatest 
possibility for maximum effectiveness for CI management. The literature describing the 
experience of business and academia provides a rich theoretical base from which to 
expand the IN experience of ESPs, and advance to the next step in IMT evolution—the 
development of a comprehensive national curriculum for standardizing training of team 
members, and instructing them in teamwork skills, such as collaboration, consensus 
decision-making, power sharing and conflict management.  
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IV. THE UC ENVIRONMENT AND WORK TEAMS 
 Chapter II examined the potential provenience of IMT conflict in organizational 
and occupational culture roots.  Chapter III made the case for IMTs as an appropriate 
strategic response to the CI threat, and applied strategic business model theory from the 
study of IONs and WTs.  In this chapter, 1) the UC environment is further described, 2) 
the nexus between WTs and IMTs is established, and, 3) the utility of WTs to fulfill the 
requirements of UC employing a collaborative process is discussed.  
WTs have been researched over the past 20 years in a more complete and 
scholarly manner compared to the relatively neophyte concept of IMTs.  This is 
attributable to the academic stature of the genre of Organizational Behavior (OB), 
whereas the FS is an action-oriented profession, and not dedicated to theoretical research.  
In contrast, the scholarly literature describing WTs grows with each passing year. 
A. BOUNDING THE PROBLEM—UNIFIED COMMAND DYNAMICS 
A visible, organized, and positive C&C system is a primary requisite for success. 
Relying on an ad hoc IMT composed of all represented ERP agencies is adequate for 
most jurisdictions at “routine” emergency incidents.95  CIs, however, invoke a different 
and enhanced regimen.  Ad hoc teams, under the circumstance of a CI, will be far less 
efficient and more dangerous to responders. 
The term “Unified Command” has a wider application than the genre of 
emergency services.  In particular, it also has an established meaning and is a regular 
model for management within the U.S. military.  It is interesting to note the 
organizational differences between the military and emergency services, and how they 
manifest in nuances of application of UC.  Because the military is federalized, and 
therefore operates under a centralized authority, it is able to designate an overall single 
commander for any operation.  Emergency services, however, are typically organized and 
funded on a local level as independent entities.  Therefore, although they respond and 
operate concurrently at an incident scene, no central authority exists to designate an 
overall commander.   
                                                 
95  On its face, the use of the terms “routine” and “emergency” in the same sentence appears oxymoronic.  
However, for responders who deal with such situations day-to-day, even emergency events vary in 
intensity, resource commitment and profile—thus the distinction. 
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An important aspect of IMT formation is that agencies frequently have legal or 
ethical mandates that they may not electively lay down.  For example, a CI—such as the 
crash of an airplane—may involve many and varied strategic priorities for which 
different agencies have jurisdiction.  In the previous example, the FS typically owns the 
responsibility for hazardous materials, fire extinguishment, and rescue of trapped 
persons.  EMS is charged by law to care for the medical welfare of injured persons, while 
LE must document and investigate deaths, control the environment to ensure the safety of 
the non-involved public, and preserve evidence for Federal investigators.  As observed by 
Douglas Riley, of the National Park Service: 
One of the biggest fears that people seem to have regarding the [UC] 
structure is that they will be “robbed” of their jurisdictional authority...the 
keystone to [UC] is that [it] will not be compromised.96 
Many laws assign ERP accountability, but tend to avoid prioritizing one 
discipline’s responsibility over another.  Dedicated and professional organizations may 
engage each in their own piece of the complex puzzle, but unless they are coordinated, 
they risk their own safety and the frustration of conflicting strategies.  One important 
function of the IMT is the process of arriving at a negotiated order of operation in pre-
incident low stress environment.  This negotiated order is best accomplished in the 
classroom through open discussion between IMT members. 
The IMT is constituted from many directly and diversely-interested organizations.  
The core of the Team is comprised of local first responders.  The remainder is dependent 
upon the target host of the CI,97 and is typically comprised of officials from other State, 
Federal or private organizations.   It may include extra-local LE, or other federal assisting 
agencies—again, depending upon the nature and location of the incident.   
The occupational and skill-set diversity of the IMT is its primary strength, and is 
also the source of its greatest challenge.  An IMT is first and foremost a team, subject to 
all of the dynamics of interpersonal relations.  Experience has shown that orientation 
diversity in a professional environment can result in conflict, and minimizing the 
negative affects while accentuating the positive is the goal of conflict management: 
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In conducting both intergroup [sic] conflict and that occurring between 
component parts of a single group, two kinds of effects may be 
distinguished.  [C]onflict may result in the destruction or disruption of all 
or certain of the bonds of unity which may previously have existed 
between the disputants. [Or]…conflict may strengthen pre-existing ties or 
contribute to the establishing bonds where none before existed. 98 
One dynamic that is ever-present at a CI is an atmosphere of high stress.  Risk 
management evaluations must be made quickly and accurately with limited information.  
Resources must be placed to best advantage, and typically under conditions of chaos.  
Commanders frequently specify strategy and tactics in the course of incident mitigation 
that bring responders into harm’s way and it is not unusual for one or more team 
members to view differently the risk involved in a strategy.  Under pressure, consensus 
decisions become more difficult, and nerves become frayed.  Any list of desirable 
characteristics for IMT members would include remaining calm and thinking clearly 
under pressure, and to constructively dealing with interpersonal or interagency conflict. 
UC purposes to bring the owners of incident accountability into a dialogue and 
collaborative effort to set and prioritize strategies within a jointly-constructed Incident 
Action Plan (IAP).  Some jurisdictions prefer to recognize one agency as the “lead”, or 
“first among equals.”  The identity/discipline of the lead changes as the incident evolves, 
and as strategic priorities are accomplished and replaced by new ones.  However, under 
pure UC theory a “lead” commander has no authority over others except to break ties and 
call planning meetings. “First among equals” smacks of oxymoronic control, perhaps a 
vestige of those who subconsciously prefer Single Command. 
B. INTRODUCTION TO WORK TEAMS 
With NIMS, the Federal government specified an outcome (UC/IMTs) without 
providing a comprehensive roadmap (training curriculum) for effectual implementation.  
This approach can be an effective one when the desired outcome is creative adaptation of 
systems and processes, but hardly makes sense when the stated objective is nationwide 
standardization.  In the absence of a NIMS IMT training standard, other organizations 
have attempted to fill the void, most notably the USFA in cooperation with the IAFC. 
The NFPA also has announced its intent to issue a tentative interim agreement this 
                                                 
98  North, Robert C.; Koch, Jr., Howard E.; Zinnes, Dina A.  “The Integrative Functions of Conflict,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4, No. 3, (Sept., 1960), 355-374 (355). 
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summer [2004] that describes the positions, roles, and responsibilities of the command 
and general staff positions within the incident management systems.”  The resulting 
amended NFPA 1561 standard has not yet been issued, and there is no evidence that it 
will address non-ICS curriculum subjects. 
Without a complete training curriculum encompassing the technical skills of ICS 
and the soft skills of team dynamics, IMTs lack important tools.  A study of non-ICS 
skills for team members in a UC environment is needed, and can best be accomplished by 
an in-depth view of CI command structures through the lens of organizational theory and 
a WT model practiced in the private sector. In the following sections, I will identify ideal 
team characteristics from the literature. 
WTs are in wide-spread usage in both the public and private sector, and are often 
the vehicle of choice when ill-defined projects of importance to an organization’s goals 
are implemented. The characteristics of this type of group make it ideally suited for the 
ambiguity, complexity, and the wide variety of expertise and service demands of a CI.  A 
basic assumption of this thesis is that the skills involved in WT success are both 
identifiable and transferable, and, that the skills and characteristics do not necessarily 
occur naturally, but can be trained and developed in almost any specified group. 
C. DEFINING WT CHARACTERISTICS 
Kirkman and Shapiro quote Wellins’, et al, definition of WTs: 
...[G]roups of employees who have the following responsibilities: (1) they 
manage themselves (e.g., plan, organize, control, staff and monitor), (2) 
they assign jobs to members (decide on who works on what, where and 
when), (3) they plan and schedule work (e.g., control the starting and 
ending times, the pace of the work, and goal-setting), (4) they make 
production- or service-related decisions (e.g., they are responsible for 
inventory, quality control decisions and work stoppage), (5) they take 
action to remedy problems (e.g., address quality issues, customer service 
needs, and member discipline and rewards).  Reported [WT] benefits 
include the capacity for the team to manage and lead itself…; the 
initiative, sense of responsibility, creativity, and problem solving that 
comes from within the team; and the team’s unique self-reliance.99 
                                                 
99  Kirkman, Bradley L.; Shapiro, Debra L.; “The Impact of Cultural Values on Employee Resistance to 
Teams: Toward a Model of Globalized Self-Managing Work Team Effectiveness;” The Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July, 1997), 730-757 (731). [emphasis added] 
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The above definition is useful in linking WTs with IMTs, as is a description of the 
characteristics and process.  The benefits cited are absolutely essential to IMT function at 
CIs.  Two problems associated with applying WT principles in the realm of emergency 
response are the variety of conceptual applications and a simultaneous lack of definition 
of a complete WT skill set.  However, many individual characteristics of group success 
have been established in the literature.  The more precise question for this chapter is 
“Which subset of WT characteristics is appropriate for IMTs application.”   
NIMS emphasizes a team effort on the part of responding agencies—the term 
“collaborate” (or derivation thereof) is used 15 times in the standard.  There does not 
appear to be a consensus definition of those skills in related literature, but at least one 
study has attempted to identify characteristics of good IMT members.  These 
characteristics include mitigating conflict, good team skills, effective communication, a 
problem solving orientation, flexibility, adaptability, cooperation, and clear delegated 
authority and support.100  The context of WT use is often the highly-creative, fluid 
environments where professionals requiring little supervision are conjoined and tasked 
with accomplishing some portion of the organization’s goals.  They are usually of mixed 
background and skills, and often cross-trained for redundancy.101  
Over the past decade Organizational Behavior (OB) literature has reported a 
growing commitment to participation.  “The basic idea of participation represents toward 
a shift toward sharing control and power.  These two notions are the foundations 
of...[OB] models for [WTs].”102  Applications of control and power sharing extend 
beyond the realm of enlightened private sector management.  Incident management 
theory has established the need for sharing of command responsibilities among 
contributing agencies to increase effectiveness and protect the legal mandates of each. 
The correlation between WTs and IMTs is strong.  WT and IMT members either 
sink or swim yoked to the team.  Each has his/her area of expertise to contribute, yet must 
be familiar with all aspects of the group’s task.  As Appelbaum, et al, notes, “...[WTs] 
consist primarily of two dynamic components: 1) the process of self-management; and, 2) 
                                                 
100  Donahue, Amy K., PhD., Incident Management Team-All Risk Operations and Management Study, 
Center for Policy Analysis and Management, Institute of Public Affairs, University of Connecticut, 
August, 2003, pg. 29. 
101  Appelbaum, Steven H., Abdallah, Chahrazad and Shapiro, Barbara T., “The Self-Directed Team: A 
Conflict Resolution Analysis,” Team Performance Management, Vol. 5, No. 2, (1999): 60-77 (61). 
102  Ibid., pg. 61. [emphasis added]. 
66 
collaborative teamwork.”103  These two common components are the strongest evidence 
in the logical linkage between WTs and IMTs (by the “Walks like a duck, quacks like a 
duck” heuristic).  Other commonalities notwithstanding, these two—self-management 
and collaboration—make WTs and IMTs brothers under the skin. 
D. FOCUS ON COLLABORATION 
Collaboration is a decision process that requires highly developed interpersonal 
skills for members:  
[C]ollaboration reduced to its simplest definition means "to work 
together." The search for a more comprehensive definition leads to a 
myriad of possibilities each having something to offer and none being 
entirely satisfactory on its own...The most robust definition (and the most 
commonly cited) seems to be found in Barbara Gray's Collaborating: 
Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems. She describes 
collaboration as "a process through which parties who see different 
aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and 
search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is 
possible." In Collaborative Leadership, David Chrislip and Carl Larson 
offer a slightly different but also useful definition: "It is a mutually 
beneficial relationship between two or more parties who work toward 
common goals by sharing responsibility, authority, and accountability 
for achieving results."104 
The above definitions are individually true of both WTs and IMTs; together they 
paint a complete picture of the interactive dynamic. The precursors for collaboration are 
relatively well-defined.  They incorporate democracy, inclusion, are hierarchy-free, and 
have team members who have a stake in the problem and are interdependent.  Structural 
relationships must minimize/neutralize individual’s political power, and a clear 
understanding among all parties regarding all participants’ goals is essential.  If the group 
fails to form a sense of temporary community, then discussions will degenerate into 
information exchange sessions rather than dialogue and synergistic creativity.105  
Collaborative efforts usually share these characteristics: 
• Problems are ill-defined, or there is disagreement about definition. 
• Stakeholders have a vested interest and are interdependent.  
                                                 
103  Ibid, pg. 61. 
104  London, Scott, “Collaboration and Community,” paper prepared for Pew Partnership for Civic 
Change; http://www.scottlondon.com/reports/ppcc.html [emphasis added] Last accessed, 12/17/04. 
105  London, Scott, Collaboration and Community, Pg. 5. 
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• These stakeholders are not necessarily identified a priori or 
organized in any systematic way.  
• There may be a disparity of power and/or resources for dealing 
with the problems among the stakeholders.  
• Stakeholders may have different levels of expertise and different 
access to information about the problems.  
• The issues may be characterized by complexity/scientific 
uncertainty.  
• Differing perspectives on the problems often lead to adversarial 
relationships among the stakeholders.  
• Incremental or unilateral efforts to deal with the problems typically 
produce less than satisfactory solutions. 
• Existing processes have proven insufficient.106  
 
Collaborative group characteristics very aptly describe the circumstances faced by IMTs, 
and constitute fruitful points of pre-incident discussion by IMT members.   
E. PHASES OF THE COLLABORATIVE PROCESS 
According to Barbara Gray in her seminal work devoted to collaboration, 
processes move through three somewhat distinct chronological phases.107  These phased 
activities are interesting in the context of IMTs in that, though they generally occur 
sequentially, they can be uncoupled and grouped as pre-event and post-event modules.108  
Since Phase 1 and half of Phase 2 are accomplished “Pre-event”, they are appropriately 
designated “preparation.”  The second half of Phases 2 and 3 are the “response” phases. 
They are incident-specific and cannot be accomplished until the “What, where, who, and 
how” are known, but should be considered when developing IMTs and the training 
curriculum.  The following paragraphs combine Ms. Gray’s work on collaboration (in 
bold) and the author’s elaboration on her work in the context of UC: 
1. Phase 1 (Pre-Event)—“Pre-negotiation Phase” or “Problem 
Setting Phase.” Six issues need to be addressed: 
• The parties must arrive at a shared definition of the problem, 
including how it relates to the various stakeholders.  This issue 
is the negotiated reality of how the IMT perceives its role, and 
what types of incidents it is likely to face.  Practicing together 
(exercising) brings into play the active imagination required to                                                  
106  London, Scott, Collaboration and Community, Pg. 3. 
107 Gray, Barbara, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems, Josey-Bass 
Publishers, San Francisco, (1991) pg. 57. 
108  Since collaboration ability of teams is the primary barometer of likely success, I will present this 
discussion in the context of what Phases and issues may be best accomplished pre-incident by a 
designated regional or local IMT—even though the detailed discussion of IMTs does not follow until 
later in this thesis.   
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“see” themselves perform successfully as a unit. Shared experience 
and problem definition process assist individuals to understand 
their role and contribution.   
• The parties must make a commitment to collaborate.  This 
commitment can only be understood in its entirety (and therefore 
binding) if all of the parties have had opportunity to raise and 
answer all of their questions about what is required for team 
membership. 
• Other stakeholders must be identified whose involvement may 
be necessary for the success of the endeavor.  At this point the 
team has the opportunity to evaluate the assembled talents/skills 
and project any unmet needs in the context of a menu of perceived 
problem. Another potential benefit is a formal gap analysis 
inventory of skills immediately available if the incident type 
experienced is not one the team has exercised on.  This knowledge 
becomes apparent as the team works its way through various field 
and table top exercises. 
• The parties must acknowledge and accept the legitimacy of 
other participants.  Credentialing and trust-building are vital in 
this step of team formation.  It can only happen in the context of 
personal history between IMT members—this issue may be the 
most cogent argument for the formation of regional IMTs. 
• The parties must decide what type of leader or convener can 
bring the parties together.  Leadership issues settled prior to 
event occurrence dissipates power struggles on the scene.  Pre-
designated IMTs must guard against domination by strong 
personalities or persons with exceptional expert power in a 
particular area. 
• The parties must determine what resources are needed for the 
collaboration to succeed.  At this stage the IMT has the 
opportunity to designate resources to stage close to where they 
may be needed.  This is a planning/logistical exercise that, if 
executed in advance by the team would dramatically reduce the 
time required to obtain critical resources.  This stage is also where 
appropriate mutual aid and automatic aid agreements/MOUs 
should be evaluated and executed. 
2. Phase 2 (Pre-Event)—Direction-Setting Phase.  This stage also 
has six issues to address: 
• The parties must establish ground rules. This phase sets the 
manner in which the team agrees to operate.  If a group functions 
together for a sustained period of time, it will develop its own 
culture.  This step can take some time, and is obviously facilitated 
if it occurs in the context of a pre-designated IMT that works and 
drills together on a regular basis.  If this step, in particular, must 
occur under the time and stress pressure of an emergency incident, 
misunderstanding and conflict are likely. 
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• Setting the agenda.  The agenda is what the IMT hopes to 
accomplish in the pre-incident phase.  In an IMT environment, 
setting the agenda refers to team agreement on a training schedule 
and objectives. The output of this step is a combined program of 
classroom instruction, team-building exercises, and table top and 
field exercises. 
• Organizing subgroups.  There are multiple applications and many 
potential configurations within the whole.  These may be ICS 
specialty-related groups (e.g., Logistics, or Plans Section), Work 
Shift/Operational Period groups, or discipline-specific subgroups 
(e.g., FS, LE, EMS, or public health).  Designating subgroups adds 
clarification to team roles, and bonds individuals to those with 
whom they will be immediately working. 109 
 
Pre-Negotiation and Problem Setting are clearly team activities that are best 
accomplished in low-stress, pre-incident environment.  The urgency of a CI will not 
allow thoughtful and progressive accomplishment of collaboration steps, making inter-
organizational conflict, inefficiency, and lack of scene safety much more likely. 
3. Phase 2 (Post-occurrence)—These issues cannot be worked out 
ahead of time, although exercises may simulate many of the 
specific decisions that must be made by the group and may speed 
reaction time and ease stress since the thought processes and 
decision points have been previously experienced by the team, 
even if only mental simulation. 
• Undertaking a joint information search to establish and 
consider the essential facts of the issue involved.  The first 
activity upon arrival of the command team will be to conduct 
reconnaissance and receive reports about situation status and 
resource status (the fire service calls this step “size up”).  It is 
essential that the IMT understand the total situation and establish a 
common definition of the problem.   
• Explore the pros and cons of various alternatives.  This step 
involves the design of a common incident strategy, and is the first 
point of potential conflict.  This step is also where experience as a 
WT will immediately pay dividends.  Specialty knowledge is also 
at a premium at this point as individuals evaluate the situation from 
the perspective of their discipline (e.g., patient care, fire control, 
material confinement, perimeter security, etc). 
• Reach agreement and convey a course of action.  The group 
must be fluent in making accurate, quick decisions, often with a 
void of information.  Consensus is the rule by which a strategy 
must be defined and conveyed to subcommands. 
                                                 
109 London, Scott, pp. 7-8. 
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4. Phase 3 (Post-occurrence)—Implementation Phase.  What has 
been decided must be communicated to various constituencies. 
• Participating groups or organizations deal with their 
constituencies.  Decisions within the IMT are made continuously 
in an ongoing response to the situational needs, and also in 
planning meetings for upcoming operational periods.  Once made, 
plans must be communicated to subcommands, best accomplished 
through chain-of-command and routine channels of participating 
organizations, and through the established protocols of ICS. 
• Parties garner the support of those who will be charged with 
implementing the agreement [action plan].   Feedback from the 
planning group is incorporated into the strategic framework to 
form the tactical objectives. 
• Structures for implementation are established.  The ICS 
structure is expanded to accommodate the Incident Action Plan 
(IAP).  Supervisors are appointed to lead subgroups, and chain- 
and unity-of-command principles are established. 
• The agreement is monitored and compliance is ensured.  
Information is received by the IMT about progress in 
accomplishing the provisions of the IAP during each operational 
period (typically 12 hours).  This information is then used to 
determine the IAP for the following periods.  The quality control 




 Chapter IV has focused on the peculiarities of the UC environment and on 
establishing the nexus between WTs and IMTs.  It has also detailed specific Phases of 
collaboration that should be addressed prior to response to a CI by any IMT.   Linking 
WT and IMTs brings all of the literature about WTs into play (by the Transitive Property 
of Equalities) for managing conflict.  Chapter V further refines these ideas and expands 
them into the realm of Work Group effectiveness.  It describes how effectiveness can be 
increased in IMTs by applying and adapting principles taught in current literature. 
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V. AN ADAPTED MODEL FOR IMT EFFECTIVENESS 
Chapter IV established the nexus between WTs and IMTs.  It also elaborated on 
the UC environment extant at a CI, explored literature citing desirable characteristics of 
WT/IMT members, and related those characteristics to IMT requirements.  It devoted 
special attention to the vital skill of collaboration, and demonstrated how the pre-incident 
phases of the collaboration process may be applied to IMTs. 
Chapter V makes application of the factors discussed in Chapter IV to the issue of 
team effectiveness.  To demonstrate it uses a published model—Hackman’s Model of 
Workgroup Effectiveness.  The chapter then offers adaptive criteria to the existing Model 
that narrows its scope from the macro realm of group effectiveness, to the micro 
application of IMT effectiveness—that is, from the set of all groups to one specific type, 
the IMT.  Using the adapted Model, the chapter is concluded by proposing a model 
demonstrating the interrelationship and union of social/team and technical skills to 
prevent conflict and contribute to a well-rounded IMT training curriculum. 
A. BLENDING WT AND IMT THEORY: HACKMAN’S MODEL  
Hackman’s Model of Work Group Effectiveness111, introduced in 1988, is useful 
for understanding the components that interact to produce a successful WT outcome.  
Hackman’s Model does not purport to relate the factors to a particular group type (e.g., 
WT) when defining relevant factors for success, but employs a universalistic approach 
applicable on the macro level to relating work group effectiveness in all its 
manifestations.  “The main concepts of this model are three activities: effort, knowledge, 
and appropriateness of the task performance strategies. An increase in these three 
activities should...improve the overall effectiveness of the group.”112  These factors 
occupy the center of the diagram and comprise the “Process Criteria of Effectiveness” 
block.  Three factors are antecedent conditions to the Process Criteria: 1) The 
Organizational Context; 2) The Group Design; and, 3) The Group Synergy.  These three 
factors work with and support effort, knowledge and strategy, and, in the context of 
sufficient material resources, produce “Group Effectiveness.”  
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Figure 5.1. Hackman’s Model for Work Group Effectiveness (1988) 
 
Hackman’s Model is pertinent to the discussion of IMTs because, as either an ad 
hoc or an established IMT, the Process Criteria of Group Effectiveness are identical 
(albeit in a different context).  The Group Effectiveness criteria are also useful measures 
of IMT success. Implicit in this thesis is the assumption that a higher quality of input 
criterion, applying identical processes, will yield a superior output.  An ad hoc team 
would not have the same pre-incident opportunity to develop the input criteria for an 
effective team output as would an IMT.   
By applying IMT-specific criteria, the adapted Model also becomes useful for 
contemplating curriculum design for training IMTs.  That is, if the outcome desired is 
IMT effectiveness, and assuming that this outcome is the result of some set of raw input 
and applies some specified process to manipulate that input, then intentional ordering of 
the input criteria should improve effectiveness.  There are four primary criteria for the 
IMT members to affect the raw skills available within the IMT:  1) Personnel selection 
(individual traits and style); 2) Rank and position in the organization (authority to commit 
resources); 3) Emergency discipline involved (domain of expertise); and, 4) Initial/on-
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going training (technical and team skills). All are important, but this thesis focuses on the 
training factor (#4). The design of training curriculum is the best opportunity to increase 
the probability of IMT effectiveness once personnel are selected.  
The component categories of the “Process Criteria of Effectiveness” block and the 
“Group Effectiveness” block are universal in WT application.  However, it is possible to 
blend Hackman’s Model and WT/IMT theory to apply specific criteria to the antecedents 
of the “Process Criteria of Effectiveness” stage (e.g., the Organizational Context, Group 
Design, and Group Synergy).  Using Hackman as a beginning point, the following 
“friendly amendment” adaptations are offered, retaining the major headings but adapting 
the sub-criteria to customize them for IMTs. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
The Organizational Context is the structure, 
culture and qualification/training/ preparation from 
which the response and mitigation effort flows.  
Since emergency task performance has a beginning 
and end (unlike the business context application of 
the model), and since excellent performance at a CI 
carries its own intrinsic motivation, the rewards 
system criteria in Hackman’s Model is not vital, although ERPs are often recognized for 
heroic performance.  [Negative rewards, such as the specter of a blistering Congressional 
After Action investigation can also be motivating!] It is vital that individuals fulfilling a 
role within the IMT complete relevant training within a recognized system and have 
received certification that validates their qualification.  ICS certification is very important 
in the universe of emergency response, and the National Wildfire Interagency 
Coordinating Group established a “Red Card System” whereby individuals may meet 
pedagogical (classroom) and andrological (“shadowing”) criteria, and demonstrate 
mastery on a recognized credential (the “Red Card”).  
Hackman’s “Education System” in the Adapted Model is divided into two distinct 
phases.  Initial Task Certification is different from Continuing Education/ Exercising 
because of the on-going nature of the latter.  Tabletop and field exercises are particularly 
important for incident preparation because, although each is unique, conditions and 
Organizational Context 
A context that supports and reinforces 
competent task work via: 
• ICS Task Certification  system 
• Network of Federal, State and local 
Preparedness 
• Continuing Education/ Exercising  
System 
• Information/Communications System 
• Authority to speak for the member’s 
agency and commit resources 
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decision processes of mitigation can be simulated to increase decision quality and provide 
an opportunity for performance feedback for participants.  The process that emergency 
responders use to make decisions under stress is called Recognition-Primed Decision 
Making (RPDM), and relies heavily on mental “slides” of past experience to guide them 
through current circumstances.  Research has shown that exercises can provide referential 
experience from which quick decisions can be made.  RPDM occurs when responders do 
not have time to move through each of the steps associated with rational decisions; 
instead, they size-up and develop situational awareness until recognizing the right thing 
to do, then act based on the nearest match between the event and the mental catalogue of 
experiences.  Exercises facilitate RPDM by increasing the number of mental “slides” in 
the responder’s tray and teach them to respond to experiences that have yet to be 
experienced in reality, but have been mitigated in the training room. 
All major incident planning post-9/11 must include DHS and DoD documents 
issued in the past two and one-half years, particularly the NIMS and NRP.  IMT training 
must include a detailed study of Federal interaction and resources available to the Team.  
Also helpful would be an introduction to civil-military relations/interaction.   
The Information/Communication System could not be more critical than under the 
conditions of a major incident.  It is not melodrama to characterize them as a matter of 
life and death.  Technical components are stressed by the urgent communications system 
“log jamming” that accompanies emergencies.  The “fix” for information exchange 
challenges is communication plan development and practice prior to the need for it. 
Communications considerations are not limited to technological solutions.  
Communication style can have a dramatic influence on group interaction.  A pre-
established IMT that has the regular opportunity/responsibility to perform in tabletop and 
field exercises also has the opportunity to adapt to one another’s communications style. 
The final aspect of organizational context is the authority for an IMT member to 
speak for his/her organization and commit resources.  Without this authority, decision-
making processes are slowed at times when speed may be essential.  Committing 
resources is tantamount to spending money, and may siphon funding from other needs.  If 
the IMT member is not the head of the organization, the IMT should seek and receive 
clarification about his/her authority in these areas prior to deployment. 
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C. GROUP DESIGN 
The NIMS’ self-stated purpose is to 
provide a template for incident organization. 
That fact would seem to lessen the 
importance of group structure as a criterion 
for effectiveness, were it not for another, equally cogent fact.  The ICS is nothing if not 
flexible, and that flexibility makes the issue of group design crucial.  Structure is at the 
heart of the system, and the four chambers of this heart are modular organization, chain 
of command, unity of command and span of control. These principles determine 
reporting and supervisory relationships—both vital to maintaining safety and 
accountability in the chaos of an incident. 
The structure of the management organization is inexorably linked to the task 
complexity.  It is axiomatic that a complex and high-profile problem attracts greater 
participation by assisting agencies and results in an expanded structure.  This structure 
then, bears directly on the makeup of the UCT. The rule of thumb is that all primary 
jurisdiction agencies should be represented in the UCT, but representatives from assisting 
agencies must reach consensus about UCT makeup.  The prerogative to decide to include 
or exclude team members theoretically belongs to no one, and everyone.  In a perfect 
world, representatives from assisting agencies would also be members of the IMT. 
Finally, Group Norms are a very sensitive area for effective functioning, and one 
in which inevitable group conflict is most preventable for pre-established IMTS.  Perhaps 
the biggest disadvantage of ad hoc teams is their lack of opportunity prior to the stress of 
the incident to establish group functional norms.  This tedious task cannot be avoided, but 
it can be worked out prior to an incident at the team’s leisure in the classroom. 
Many of the norms are institutional within ICS, and to the degree the roles have 
been practiced, adaptive pressure may be lessened.  However, no emergency planning or 
training manual can cover the minutia of interactive norms over the course of a multi-
operational period incident.  One of the strengths of the WT is the group’s 
interdependence.  Interdependence relies on trust and knowledge of teammates’ patterns 
of thought and behavior.  Thus group norms are the “glue” that holds the team together. 
Group Design 
A Design that prompts and facilitates competent 
work on the task via: 
• Structure and complexity of the task 
• Composition of the IMT 
• Group norms about performance process 
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D. GROUP SYNERGY 
The most intangible factor 
affecting process effectiveness is Group 
Synergy.  It is also one where definition 
of WT skills can add value to current 
training practices.  Synergy is formally 
defined as “[A] mutually advantageous 
conjunction or compatibility of distinct 
business participants or elements.”113 The 
colloquial definition is “1+1=3”, or, “The whole is greater than the sum of the parts.” 
Synergy is the fuel of a “self-propelled team”—that accomplishes its mission by 
group effort and inter-reliance without external impetus.  Team members draw energy 
from the engagement, talents, skills, creativity and compatibility of group processes.  In 
such an environment, interpersonal trust and individual skills tend to exceed personal and 
interpersonal expectations, giving the illusion of organizational magic. 
However, operationalizing synergy is not nearly as mysterious as it first appears.  
Synergy components can be trained, and the environment within which it appears can be 
reconstructed as carefully as a delicate ship in a bottle.  Deconstructing synergy, though 
prosaic, can fill in missing segments in the roadmap to UC success. 
A synergistic team has the skill of reaching consensus without overpowering one 
another.  A synergistic team is reasonable; it does not take positions to defend, but 
searches for common interests to satisfy.  Group synergy is preserved in an atmosphere 
that considers others’ moral and legal imperatives, and seeks strategic solutions to satisfy 
them.  Interpersonal and professional knowledge promote synergy by encouraging 
cooperation and maintaining relationships.  It acknowledges the inevitability of conflict, 
and agrees to use conflict as a stepping stone to greater unity.  The team learns how to 
dialogue, and not just exchange information.  Finally, a synergistic team is connected by 
a strong bond—a sense of pride that comes from being part of a worthwhile effort, and 
ownership in the quality of the outcome—not only the result, but the process as well.  
With the foregoing sections in mind, a friendly amendment to Hackman’s Model 
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knowledge and respect (social capital) 
• Shares a sense of pride for being involved in a 
worthy effort 
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specific to IMTs and a CI environment is offered (see Figure 5:2).  The adapted model 
bridges between work group research and IMTs as a form of WT.  The three blocks on 
the right side of the model are, for the most part, unchanged because they are universal to 
all WTs.  The left side blocks have been adapted to reflect the initial formation, initial 
training and continuing training of the IMT, including characteristics of WTs that should 
be included in the training and development of the team. 
 
 




A context that supports and reinforces 
competent task work via: 
• ICS Task Certification  system 
• Network of Federal, State and local 
Preparedness 
• Continuing Education/Exercising  
System 
• Information/Communications System 
• Authority to speak for the member’s 
agency and commit resources 
Group Design 
A design that prompts and facilitates 
competent work on the task via: 
• Structure and complexity of the task 
• Composition of the UCT 
• Group norms about performance 
process 
Group synergy 
Assistance to the group by interacting in ways that: 
• Reaches consensus decisions 
• Resolves conflict constructively 
• Spirit of cooperation 
• Engages in dialogue, not debate 
• Preserves legal and moral  agency accountability 
• Promotes personal and professional knowledge and 
respect (social capital) 
• Shares a sense of pride for being involved in a 
worthy effort (team intrinsic value) 
• Group owns outcomes 
Process Criteria of Effectiveness 
• Level of effort brought to bear on the 
group task 
• Amount of knowledge and skill 
applied to task work 
• Appropriateness of the task perfor-
mance  strategies used by the group 
Group Effectiveness 
• Task acceptable to those who 
receive or review it 
• Capability to work together in 
the future is maintained or 
strengthened 
• Members’ needs are more 
satisfied than frustrated by the 
group experience 
Material Resources 
Sufficiency of material 
resources required to 
accomplish the task well 
and on time 
Figure 5.2—Hackman’s Model 
of Work Group Effectiveness  
(Adapted) 
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E. CP CONFLICT FAULT TREE DIAGRAM (CPCFTD) 
Assuming that the type of IMT cultural conflict described in Chapter 2 decreases 
Team efficiency, understanding how elements interact as a system to contribute to the 
total problem of CP conflict is important.  The Systems View of a problem is not always 
apparent—one method for exposing the relational components (Systems View) of 
conflict is to use a Fault Tree Diagram (FTD).  A FTD reveals component interaction and 
ever greater levels of detail while moving from the top level of the diagram, through the 
logic gates of “and” or “or,” to the lowest component level of detail desired.  At each 
level, the question “What Y must happen for X to occur?” where Y is a sublevel below 
X, and is therefore a component of X is asked.  Repeating this process at each level leads 
from the global issue at the top of the diagram (CP Conflict) to the individual elements 
addressable by the intentional intervention of training.  
The interaction of three elements determines the level of CP conflict.  Like the 
Phases of Collaborative Process discussed in Chapter 4, some of the three elements can 
be mitigated pre-incident through IMT formation and training processes.  Figure 5.3 is a 
Fault Tree Analysis depicting four levels of derivate analysis to deconstruct the question, 
“What is to happen if Command Post Conflict is to happen?”  Each subsequent diagram 
block gives greater detail contributing to the understanding of the block above it. 
Considering the initial question, “What must happen for CP conflict to happen?” 
three elements govern: 1) Organizational Elements, 2) Individual Elements; and, 3) 
Situational Elements (Level 2 of the diagram).  Compared to the raw input stage of 
Hackman’s Model, the CPCFTD viewpoint considers a different outcome. Whereas 
Hackman concluded three factors—Organizational Context, Group Design and Group 
Synergy—contribute to efficiency (accentuating the positive, if you will), the CPCFTD 
focuses on avoiding the negative of conflict.  The two together result in a well-rounded, 
multi-dimensional approach to problem-solving for training curriculum purposes. 
Situational Elements present limited opportunities to control the emergency scene.  
Both Environmental and Contextual features (Level 3) often cannot be mitigated, but 
identifying them helps to lessen their effects through planning, training, equipment 
purchase and relationship building. 
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Level 3 of the CPCFTD also supports this chapter’s previous assertion that there 
are four primary criteria determining the raw skills available to the IMT from members: 
1) Personnel selection; 2) Rank and position in the organization; 3) Emergency discipline 
involved; and, 4) Initial/on-going training.  These four criteria represent the opportunity 
to affect the outcome by controlling the input to the IMT.  Level 3 addresses two of the 
four criteria.  The opportunity to influence personnel selection is represented by the 
“Trait Based” column under “Individual Elements.”  Traits, in this sense, are intrinsic 
features to individual candidates, and are not typically items that can be trained. 
Those team member elements that are most under the control of those responsible 
for forming the IMT are those on the left side of the diagram labeled “Trained Technical 
Skills” and “Trained ‘Soft Skills’.”  Both categories consist of knowledge, skills and 
abilities that can be imparted to willing students. These skills are divided into categories 
relating to the organization itself, the members forming it, and comprise the bulk of the 
proposed foundation of IMT training.  The following describes each category’s purpose: 
• ICS/Technical—this category is the body of ICS knowledge that is currently 
being recommended in the IMT training roadmap.  It refers to the already existing 
training curriculum, and also references the potential for Command conflict when 
answering questions relating to strategic and technical direction on-scene.  
• Structural—also part of the current curriculum, this category describes the 
organizational aspects of the ICS.  It addresses standard functional roles and 
responsibilities of each position. 
• Cultural—the cultural branch refers to the organizational culture of the new IMT 
as it develops.  This branch represents the “Cultural Intelligence” education of the 
Team referenced in Chapter 3.  As the IMT builds its culture, the topics addressed 
in this category form the nucleus of how the organization works together, how the 
members tackle problems, understand each others’ roles and contributions, and 
reach a negotiated agreement on the “working personality” of the team. 
• Style-Based—whereas the Cultural category refers to the organization, the Style-
Based column speaks to distinguishing qualities of individuals.  “Styles” in this 
usage are trainable aspects of how the individuals within the IMT relate to each 
other and perform their duties. 
 
Though beyond the scope of this thesis to recommend a specific curriculum 
structure the information in the two models presented in this chapter form the 
philosophical base for expanding the current technically-based IMT curriculum.  Altering 
the current “training roadmap” according to the Models would result in a better-rounded 
team skills curriculum.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
IMTs are an important piece of America’s preparedness for CIs.  This thesis has 
shown that these teams are an emerging standard for incident management, are required 
of all Federal participation and funding, and are being recommended for regional and 
local formation.  But as they proliferate, they must have complete training (that is, 
beyond mere technical skills of ICS), continuous exercising, and team members must 
commit to dedicate time to the total development of team dynamics and social capital.   
As noted by Alan Brunacini, Fire Chief of the Phoenix, AZ Fire Department, 
“Unified Command begins at lunch.”  This thesis draws the correlation between the “soft 
skills” in Work Team theory and their usefulness in a Unified Command context.  
Although they operate in the parallel universes of business and emergency response, the 
two team types can learn from one another.  However, the characteristics and skills of 
WTs are better researched and identified.  Some of the skills identified from the literature 
are collaboration, power sharing, consensus decision making, dialogue, team pride and 
ownership of outcomes, and the ability to build social capital. 
In order to define the applicable subset of WT characteristics and skills, I began 
with a published model of WT effectiveness.  Then, applying published principles and 
my own command experience, I adapted the model to reflect specific characteristics of an 
IMT.  The adaptation points to specific areas of instruction which may be added to 
current ICS curriculum for IMT training to “round out” the skills necessary to function in 
an IMT environment. 
A. SUMMARY QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
1.   What is the Impact of Occupational and Cultural Differences among 
First Responders? 
Chapter II was dedicated to discussing the organizational and occupational 
differences that exists between ERPs.  The knowledge is vital to ERP CP representatives 
because it is critical that each member of the IMT understand that the other members 
representing the other disciplines view the world—and therefore the problems presented 
by a CI—dramatically differently. The understanding becomes all the more important 
when the topic of discussion is putting the three (or more) ERP disciplines together in the 
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same CP, throw in an assortment jurisdictions, private sector interests, and a plethora of 
representatives (typically strangers to the local first responders) from State and Federal 
government, then cook the mixture under the high heat of catastrophic incident stress. 
The extant inter-occupational cultures are supported by a foundation of myths, 
schemas and organizational history.  The relationship between local ERPs can be equated 
with natural family sibling rivalry, with each discipline fighting for its place in the local 
“Hero’s Story.”  Usually the verbal jostling is good natured—at least on the surface—but 
there is potential for serious consequences without pre-incident relationship development 
by IMT members.  To counteract the potential disruptive conflict I propose adding a 
“cultural intelligence” portion to the IMT curriculum dedicated to sharing openly any 
pre-existing animosity, and promoting a better understanding of the origin of each 
discipline’s interests and contributions to the Team. 
2.  How Comparable are Work Teams and IMTs/UCTs? 
Colloquial wisdom contributes to society the “Walks like a duck, quacks like a 
duck...it’s a duck!” rule of thumb.  Chapter III laid the groundwork for IMTs as a 
collective strategic response to CIs, and in particular to the problem of terrorism.  
Particular attention was paid to how a team’s approach to preparation is the appropriate 
strategy.  Chapter IV discussed WTs, how they function, and described how well fitted 
they are for a UC environment such as exists at a CI.  Chapter V made further application 
from current literature regarding WT effectiveness, and how a universal effectiveness 
model (Hackman’s Model) could be easily and appropriately adapted for IMTs.  
The concept of WTs evolved in the realm of business to meet the challenges of a 
complex environment, to blend the contributions of multiple problem perspectives while 
engaging goals important to the consortium, to build a functional paradigm of 
collaboration between former competitors, and/or to take advantage of efficiencies 
offered by a multi-disciplined approach.  There is no more apt description of the 
challenges faced ERPs at a CI than those cited as reasons for WT establishment.   
3.   To What Extent is the Body of Literature Pertaining to Work Teams 
Applicable to the Function of IMTs/UCTS During a CI? 
The author’s understanding of the purpose of IMT formation is to provide a core 
team of leadership to set goals and strategy, and direct activities that speed recovery from 
a major incident.  Chapters II, III, IV and V cited a considerable body of literature to 
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promote the philosophical connection between WTs and the IMT.  By connecting the 
purpose, mission, challenges and environment of WTs and IMTs, the accompanying 
literature is also connected by the Transitive Law of Equalities. 
Responding to the environment is a key concept for both WTs and IMTs.  The 
motivation for businesses and non-profits to form WTs is different from ERPs, and the 
particulars of the business environment faced by each may be dramatically different—
e.g., making widgets versus recovering from the chaos of collapsed skyscrapers.  
However, they share in common the underlying issues of complexity, multiple players, 
and the absolute need for collaboration.  They also share the human psychological and 
sociological response to diverse challenges.  
Much of the existing literature concerning IMTs is still dedicated to cajoling 
ERPs into working together rather than describing the inner working of teams.  The WT 
literature is far advanced in describing human/team response to challenges.  
Understanding the psychological/sociological response is more important in determining 
the actor’s role in the drama than the arena in which it is played out.  Public service 
agencies need to recognize the considerable advantage of being able to ride the coattails 
of business and non-profit agencies that have not only established WTs as a way of doing 
business, but have deconstructed and published information concerning them as well.  
ERPs and the Federal government bureaucracies that support them (DHS, FEMA, ODP, 
etc.) should recognize the work already done by academia and business, and leverage this 
considerable advantage by devoting resources for studying how the advantages of WTs 
might be better and more completely applied to IMTs.  This thesis suggested a model—
itself a derivative of the existing literature—to serve as a pattern of measuring IMT 
effectiveness, and another to serve as the beginning point of discussion and study for 
expanding the current curriculum. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the results of this study, I make the following recommendations: 
1) Metropolitan areas able to do so should form and train IMTs. 
2) IMT initial and on going training should include material on the concept 
and skills of collaboration, consensus decision making, and team building 
in a national standard curriculum for IMTs. 
3) The national standard should include a standard schedule for routine table 
top and field exercises for IMTs to maintain skills and certification, and to 
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promote “well-oiled” team dynamics. 
4) IMT initial and on going training should include material on the legal and 
moral accountability of each participating agency in a national standard 
curriculum for IMTs. 
5) Each IMT should be encouraged to meet regularly in social settings to 
promote personal and professional knowledge and respect. 
6) IMT members should increase their Cultural Intelligence by openly 
discussing organizational, occupational culture, and historical issues 
between ERPs that can create misunderstanding and lead to conflict. 
7) A nationally recognized certification system (similar to the National 
Wildfire Coordinating Group “Red Card” System) specific to IMTs should 
be developed. 
8) Jurisdictions should plan for the timely replacement of initial incident 
commanders at CIs with certified IMT members. 
9) The regional/local IMT formation process should include (at least) the 
aspects of collaborative process detailed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
10) The U.S. Office of Domestic Preparedness should commission further 
studies to enhance the theoretical/academic base for IMTs. 
Further research on effective performance specific to Incident Management 
Teams in unique context of Unified Command should be performed.  Emergency 
Response Providers, DHS and ODP have a common interest in developing the genre and 
more extensively applying what is known about team effectiveness to IMTs.   
Another area where further research is needed is increasing Cultural Intelligence 
among those likely to interact at the CP of a catastrophic incident.  The study should 
probe the depths of O/O culture conflicts between ERPs, and should also be expanded to 
include cultural differences between levels of government, and public vs. private sector 
perspectives. 
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